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INCREMENTAL VERSUS FUNDAMENTAL
TAX REFORM AND THE
ToP ONE PERCENT
Deborah A. Geier*
A variety of evidence, both qualitative and quantitative, strongly sug-
gests that people at the top end of the wealth and income distribution
behave in ways that are substantially different from the behavior of
most of the rest of the population.
-Christopher D. Carroll'
[R]ecent press accounts have estimated Bill Gates's net worth at $100
billion. Assuming a 10 percent annual rate of return, Gates would
have to spend $10 billion a year, or over $25 million a day, on
nondurable goods and services simply to avoid further [wealth]
accumulation.
-Christopher D. Carroll2
[A]ny departure from equity must have clear justification in terms of
probable effectiveness with regard to growth.
-Richard Musgrave3
Introduction
N his 1985 book, John Witte sought to explore the "long-term conse-
quences of incremental politics" by studying the incremental changes
made to the income tax over the years. 4 Not surprisingly, his study
concluded that "in the area of taxation a highly incremental process has
produced radical policy changes over time." 5 That is to say, incremental
change over time has already resulted in fundamental shifts in both what
is taxed and who is taxed.
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.
©Deborah A. Geier 2003.
1. Christopher D. Carroll, Why Do the Rich Save So Much?, in DOES ATLAS
SHRUG?: THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 465, 481 (Joel B. Slemrod
ed., 2000) [hereinafter ATLAS].
2. Id. at 476-77.
3. Letter from Richard Musgrave (a leading tax expert) to Walter Heller (later head
of President Kennedy's Council of Economic Advisors), reprinted in JOHN F. WITrE, THE
POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 159 (1985).
4. WITrE, supra note 3, at xxii.
5. Id. at 19.
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Until the twentieth century (except for a brief period of income taxa-
tion to fund the Civil War), the federal government raised virtually all of
its revenue through various forms of consumption taxes, such as tariffs.
Those who debated whether or not to enact an income tax at the end of
the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century showed a
sophisticated understanding of the difference between consumption taxa-
tion and income taxation and of the regressiveness of consumption taxes.
Supporters of income taxation argued that it would more fairly apportion
the tax burden by shifting it away from consumption to capital income.
Erik Jensen, for example, has compiled a host of provocative quotations
by legislators of the day that show such an appreciation, some of which
follow. 6 Ohio Senator John Sherman said:
A few years of further experience will convince the body of our peo-
ple that a system of national taxes which rests the whole burden of
taxation on consumption, and not one cent on property or income, is
intrinsically unjust .... [T]he consumption of the rich does not bear
the same relation to the consumption of the poor as the income of
the one does to the wages of the other.
7
Representative Benton McMillan of Tennessee, chairman of the Ways
and Means Subcommittee on Internal Revenue, stated:
I ask of any reasonable person whether it is unjust to expect that a
small per cent of this enormous revenue shall be placed upon the
accumulated wealth of the country instead of placing all upon the
consumption of the people .... And yet when it is proposed to shift
this burden from those who can not bear it to those who can; to di-
vide it between consumption and wealth; to shift if from the laborer
who has nothing but his power to toil and sweat, to the man who has
a fortune made or inherited, we hear a hue and cry raised by some
individuals that it is unjust and inquisitorial in its nature .... 8
He added: "The taxes having continually increased upon consumption,
and no corresponding increase having been placed upon accumulation,
we see such colossal fortunes amassed as were never accumulated in any
other age or in any other country of the world." 9 Senator Henry M. Teller
of Colorado posited that the rich who spent little would be taxed the
same as the poor who spent the same amount: "The man who holds mil-
lions of dollars' worth of property pays no more, perhaps, under the gen-
eral taxes levied upon consumption than the man who has not any
property." 10 A House Ways and Means Committee Report also stressed
the shift from consumption taxation to taxation of income from capital
6. See generally Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the
Meaning of "Incomes," 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057 (2001) (questioning whether a federal tax on
consumption only could be imposed under the authority of the sixteenth amendment with-
out apportionment among the states).
7. Id. at 1094 (quoting JOHN SHERMAN, SELECTED SPEECHES ON FINANCE AND TAX-
ATION, FROM 1859-1878, at 336, 348-49 (1879)).
8. Id. at 1096-97 (quoting 26 CONG. REC. app. 413 (Jan. 29, 1894)).
9. Id. at 1098 (quoting 26 CONG. REC. app. 415 (Jan. 29, 1894)).
10. Id. at 1097 (quoting 26 CONG. REC. 6692 (June 22, 1894)).
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when it stated: "The wealth of this country amounts to more than
$65,000,000,000, and the question arises whether it is not just and fair that
a portion of this money should be raised by a tax on the earnings of
wealth instead of imposing it all, or nearly all, on consumption."'1 Mis-
souri Representative Uriel S. Hall argued for an income tax so that "the
wealth of this country should help to bear the burden of national taxa-
tion," which didn't occur "[u]nder our tariff system [where] its burdens
are put upon consumption.' 2 Arkansas Representative Hugh A. Dins-
more phrased it: "We propose to tax the accumulated wealth of the coun-
try rather than the consumption. . ".. ,,13 Representative Josiah Patterson
of Tennessee:
I have heard it said [the income tax] would be a discriminating tax.
This can only be so on the assumption that it would be class legisla-
tion to tax property, and that taxes to be just ought to be imposed
exclusively on articles of consumption. Such an assumption is revolt-
ing alike to every sentiment of humanity and justice. 14
Representative Elijah V. Brookshire of Indiana: "[The income tax] re-
lieves consumption, and therefore gives relief where it should be given in
fact.' 5 Representative Clifton R. Breckenridge of Arkansas:
You can tax, as we do under our existing tariff and excise system, the
consumption of the people, the necessaries of life, and the luxuries of
life, and if a man be but a farthing above the point of starvation,
under a system which taxes consumption we impose a burden upon
him. But under this system what a man has above what he spends
pays no Federal tax at all. In taxing incomes we pursue a far more
enlightened policy.16
Senator Henry M. Teller of Colorado: "It has been asserted here and it
has been asserted elsewhere that a tax upon consumption and consump-
tion alone does not properly distribute the burdens of taxation among the
people. '1 7 Senator Bailey of Texas: "Under any circumstances, an income
tax is more equitable than a tax on consumption. It is more just as be-
tween the different classes .... -18 And:
I believe not that wealth ought to supplement the tax which con-
sumption pays, but I believe wealth ought to bear it all. I think it is a
monstrous injustice for the law to compel any man to wear a suit of
clothes and then tax him for buying it .... I believe that all taxes
ought to be laid on property and none of it should be laid upon
consumption.' 9
11. Id. at 1099-1100 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 53-276, at 3 (1894)).
12. Id. at 1100 (quoting Uriel S. Hall, An Income Tax: Reasons in Its Favor, 17 FORUM
14, 14-15 (1894)).
13. Id. (quoting 26 CONG. REC. app. 275 (Jan. 29, 1894)).
14. Id. at 1100-01 (quoting 26 CONG. REc. app. 76 (Jan. 23, 1894)).
15. Id. at 1101 (quoting 26 CONG. REC. app. 315 (Jan. 31, 1894)).
16. Id. (quoting 26 CONG. REC. app. 439 (Jan. 30, 1894)).
17. Id. (quoting 26 CONG. REC. 6692 (June 22, 1894)).
18. Id. at 1124 (quoting 44 CONG. REC. 1538 (Apr. 26, 1909)).
19. Id. at 1124 n.343 (quoting 44 CONG. REC. 1702 (May 4, 1909)).
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Representative Ollie M. James of Kentucky: "[N]o tax was ever more
unjust . . . than a tax upon consumption . *... -o Representative De
Armond of Missouri:
There is no good reason why taxation should not be according to
ability to pay-according to wealth, according to income. Your tariff
tax is a tax upon necessity, a tax in proportion to the amount you
buy, a tax in proportion to what you must have, not a tax in propor-
tion to what you possess.21
Representative Martin Dies of Texas: "What form of taxation could be
more unjust than to tax a man in proportion to what he eats, wears, and
uses?" 22 Representative Cyrus Cline of Ohio: "I believe in an income tax
because it taxes what a man really has. It taxes wealth, not want; accumu-
lated possessions, instead of consumption. '23 As Professor Jensen pithily
put it: "And so on. Trust me, there are many, many more examples. I'm
not making this up."' 2 4
The income tax that was eventually enacted in 1913 was thus specifi-
cally aimed at income from capital by establishing personal exemption
amounts that were high enough to free most labor income earned by
most workers from taxation. So, although it was denominated a tax on
"income," it's not too far-fetched to say that it acted primarily as a tax on
the capital income of the wealthy. 25 Even Treasury Secretary Andrew W.
Mellon, no knee-jerk liberal,26 argued in the 1920s that earned income
ought to be more lightly taxed than capital income. (And, as described
below, a tax on earned income only is, in essence, a consumption tax.)
The fairness of taxing more lightly incomes from wages, salaries and
professional services than the incomes from business or from invest-
ments is beyond question. In the first case, the income is uncertain
and limited in duration; sickness or death destroys it and old age
diminishes it. In the other, the source of the income continues; the
income may be disposed of during a man's life and it descends to his
heirs.
Surely we can afford to make a distinction between the people
whose only capital is their mental and physical energy, and the peo-
20. Id. at 1125 (quoting 44 CONG. REC. 4398 (July 12, 1909)).
21. Id. (quoting 44 CONG. REC. 4420 (July 12, 1909)).
22. Id. at 1126 (quoting 44 CONG. REC. 4426 (July 12, 1909)).
23. Id. (quoting 44 CONG. REC. 4436 (July 12, 1909)).
24. Id. at 1102.
25. Fewer than 2% of workers filed income tax returns between 1913 and 1915. See
WIYI'E, supra note 3, at 78.
26. Al Gore, Sr., criticized the post-WWII income tax rate decreases proposed by the
Republicans as "right out of the Andrew Mellon primer on special privilege." Id. at 132.
Michael Graetz refers to William Simon-President Ford's Treasury Secretary-as "proba-
bly the most conservative Treasury Secretary since Andrew Mellon." MICHAEL GRAETZ,
THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 224-25 (1997). Mellon was the first to
argue adamantly in the political arena for supply-side reductions of high marginal rates on
the wealthy as the "scientific" way to raise revenue through a growing economy. He analo-
gized the "right" tax rate to the right "price" charged by a business to maximize overall
profit. See ANDREW W. MELLON, TAXATION: THE PEOPLE'S BUSINESS 93-107 (1924).
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ple whose income is derived from investments. Such a distinction
would mean much to millions of American workers and would be an
added inspiration to the man who must provide a competence during
his few productive years to care for himself and his family when his
earning capacity is at an end.27
A credit for earned income was thus introduced in 1924. While it waxed
and waned over the years, the idea was reinvigorated in 1969, when the
top rate for "earned income" was capped at 50%, while the top rate for
other (capital) income was 70%. The rate preference for labor income
was maintained until the 1981 Reagan-era tax act, when the top marginal
rate was reduced to 50% for all income, whether from labor or capital.28
The labor income of the lower and middle classes was not taxed at the
federal level to any real extent until the Social Security Act was enacted
in 1935, which imposed a tax on wage income only, up to a certain ceiling,
with no exemption amount.29 No capital income was (or is) taxed under
the payroll taxes, and the first dollar earned was (and is) taxed. From
1939 through 1949, for example, the tax was imposed at a rate of 1% on
both the employer and employee on wages up to $3,000.30
Because of the generous personal exemptions under the income
tax-$2,500 for married couples and $1,000 for single taxpayers,
along with $400 for each dependent, at a time when few households
earned as much each year-the 2% payroll tax was the only tax paid
by the vast majority of lower and middle class workers .... By 1939,
only about 5 percent of the population paid income taxes.31
The year 1935 also saw the introduction of an undistributed profits tax on
corporations, a form of capital taxation, though rate reductions for capital
gains also were enacted.32 Nevertheless, I think it a fair generalization to
say that, prior to World War II (WWII), almost all income was taxed at
the federal level once, with the labor income of the poor and middle class
taxed primarily under the Social Security tax and the capital income of
the wealthy under the income tax.
WWII changed all that. The income "class tax" became a "mass tax"
with the drastic lowering of exemption amounts to tax the labor income
of the lower and middle classes. The labor income of the lower and mid-
dle classes was thus taxed both under the income tax and again under the
payroll tax. This represented a paradigm shift in both what was taxed and
27. MELLON, supra note 26, at 56-58. E.R.A. Seligman, of Columbia, an influential
early commentator on income taxation, also supported "differentiating between earned
and unearned income, on the grounds that unearned income is a reliable symptom of
greater freedom to choose how the income will be used." Stephen Utz, Ability to Pay, 23
WHITrIER L. REV. 867, 913 (2002).
28. See WIrrE, supra note 3, at 168, 192-93.
29. See generally Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens of the Federal Income
and Payroll Taxes on Labor Income, 22 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2002) (describing the develop-
ment of the federal payroll taxes on labor income).
30. See id. at 24.
31. Id.
32. See Wrrr, supra note 3, at 100-03, 108.
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who was taxed, though the rates for the lower and middle classes were
still low (by today's standards) under both the income and payroll taxes.
And the top marginal rates under the income tax were high, topping out
at greater than 90% in the 1940s.
The top income rate was reduced to 70% during the Kennedy adminis-
tration, where it remained until Ronald Reagan took office. In 1981, the
top income tax rate was reduced to 50% (and, as noted before, the sepa-
rate, lower rate for "earned income" disappeared). In 1986, it was nomi-
nally reduced to 28%. Though increased in 1993 to 39.6%, the top rate
stands at 38.6% today and is scheduled to be reduced to 35% in 2006
(though, without legislative action, it will go back up to 39.6% in 2011).33
Moreover, the value of the personal exemptions, which were not indexed
for inflation, deteriorated over time, and rates rose for the lower and
middle classes over time as well (through so-called bracket creep), so that
the income tax became- significant for the poor and the middle class by
the 1970s.34 "By the end of the 1970s, nearly 80% of Americans were
paying higher taxes because of bracket creep. '35 Between 1964 and 1980,
inflation alone increased the percentage of income taxed at 35% or more
from 8% (and only 1% of returns had income taxed at these rates) to
31% (and more than 10% of returns had income in these brackets). 36 The
introduction of the earned income tax credit for the working poor (aimed
initially at "rebating," in effect, the payroll taxes but expanded since then
to provide transfer payments in excess of that rebate) has effectively
taken the working poor off the income tax rolls, 37 but the average wage
earner continues to pay income tax (as well as payroll taxes).
At the same time that the top income tax rates were being slashed to
historically low post-WWII levels in the early and mid-1980s, the burden
of the payroll taxes, which now included not only the Social Security tax
but also the Medicare tax (introduced in 1965), was being significantly
increased through both increases in the tax rates and expansion of the tax
base (by increasing the wage ceiling in step with average wage increases
in the economy). For 2002, the first $84,900 of wages or self-employment
income is subject to a 12.4% Social Security tax.38 While 6.2% is collected
from each of the employer and employee (in the employment context),
economists generally agree that the economic incidence of both the em-
ployer and employee portions of the payroll taxes is borne by the em-
ployee. 39 All wages and self-employment income, without a cap, are
subject to an additional 2.9% Medicare tax (1.45% on each of the em-
33. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001).
34. See generally GRAETZ, supra note 26, at 52-67 (describing the effects of inflation
on the personal exemptions and tax brackets).
35. Id. at 54.
36. Id.
37. See Geier, supra note 29, at 25, 59.
38. See id. at 16-17.
39. See id. at 17.
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ployer and employee). 40 "Thus, wages and self-employment income up to
$84,900 (as of 2002) are taxed at a total combined flat rate of 15.3%, with
no exemptions or deductions, while wages and self-employment income
above that ceiling continue to be taxed at a flat rate of 2.9%."41 As im-
plied by the term "payroll taxes," these taxes continue to apply only to
labor income, not capital income of any sort.
Provocative work by Andrew Mitrusi and James Poterba has docu-
mented the increasing burden of the payroll taxes on the labor income of
the poor and lower middle class since the late 1970s.42
As of 1999, nearly two-thirds of families pay more in payroll taxes
than they do in income taxes, while fewer than one-quarter of fami-
lies pay more in income taxes than they do in payroll taxes. By com-
parison, in 1979, only 44% of families paid more in payroll taxes than
income taxes. Moreover, the families that pay more in payroll taxes
than in income taxes are overwhelming low- and middle-income fam-
ilies. Mitrusi and Poterba showed that an overwhelming majority of
families with adjusted gross income of $100,000 or less in 1999 paid
more in payroll taxes than in income taxes, with very few families
with adjusted gross income of more than $100,000 paying more in
payroll taxes than income taxes. Mean income taxes do not reach
approximate parity with mean payroll taxes until one reaches
$75,000 to $100,000 of adjusted gross income (AGI), increased by
certain items of untaxed income (adjusted AGI). "At income levels
below $50,000, more than three-quarters of families have payroll tax
bills that exceed their income taxes. At adjusted AGI levels above
$200,000, income taxes exceed payroll taxes for virtually all
families." 43
Almost as much revenue is now raised under the regressive payroll taxes
as is raised under the individual income tax, whereas until 1963 the indi-
vidual income tax raised more than twice as much revenue as the payroll
taxes. 44 Between 1965 and 1999, payroll taxes nearly doubled as a per-
centage of GDP (from a little more than 3% to nearly 6.5%)45 while indi-
vidual income taxes rose much more slowly, from nearly 8% of GDP to
nearly 12%,46 and corporate taxes declined from about 4% of GDP to
about 2.5%.47
40. See id.
41. Id. at 17-18.
42. See Andrew Mitrusi & James M. Poterba, The Changing Importance of Payroll and
Income Taxes on U.S. Families, in 15 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 95 (James M.
Poterba ed., 2001); Andrew Mitrusi & James M. Poterba, The Distribution of Payroll and
Income Tax Burdens, 1979-1999, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 765 (2000) [hereinafter Distribution]. See
generally Geier, supra note 29, at 19-23 (summarizing their work).
43. Geier, supra note 29, at 19-20 (footnotes omitted; quoting Distribution, supra note
42, at 765, 771).
44. See Geier, supra note 29, at 23.
45. See John Buckley & Al Davis, Extraterritorial Income/Corporate Inversion Debate:
Will Myths Prevail?, 96 TAX NOTES 289, 294 fig.3 (2002).
46. See id.
47. See id.
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This evolution has produced a federal tax system that is, today, a con-
sumption tax in many respects for the poor and middle class (actually, a
system that provides them better than consumption tax treatment, for rea-
sons discussed shortly), at a combined tax rate under both the payroll and
income taxes that is higher than commonly perceived, and an income tax
(albeit with some consumption tax features) for the wealthy, with margi-
nal rates under the income tax at comparatively low levels for the post-
war period. To see why this is true, I need to very briefly describe the
forms of consumption tax that various supporters argue should entirely
replace the income tax, returning us to a pre-16th amendment world by
taxing only consumption, not returns to capital. (My description will be
brief, as I believe that most readers of this essay will likely be familiar
already with the various forms of consumption tax proposals.)
A tax imposed on retail sales-a sales tax-is the most easily under-
stood consumption tax. Because of serious enforcement difficulties, the
regressiveness inherent in a single, flat rate, and the high rate that would
have to be imposed to raise the same revenue that is collected under the
income tax, however, a sales tax is not a serious contender as a form of
consumption tax that could replace the income tax. A value-added tax
(VAT) is essentially a sales tax that is collected piecemeal at each stage of
the manufacturing process, rather than all at once at the retail sale (and
for that reason is more difficult to evade). For example, under a subtrac-
tion-method VAT, each merchant in the chain from raw materials to fin-
ished product pays tax on a base equal to the sales price she gets in the
market for her goods less any purchased inputs (except wages paid to
employees) and thus pays a tax on the "value added" at that stage. The
aggregate amount collected by the time the product is sold to the con-
sumer should be the same as that collected under a retail sales tax. Many
European countries have VATs, as well as our neighbor to the north,
though no country relies solely on consumption taxes. These countries
typically impose a VAT in addition to income taxes. 48
In an effort to introduce some progressivity into a VAT, Robert E. Hall
and Alvin Rabushka advocate what they call the "flat tax,' '49 which is a
business VAT with the exception that wages would be permitted to be
deducted (unlike under a traditional VAT), and the employees would be
taxed under the same VAT tax rate on wages received above a basic ex-
emption amount. At the individual level, in other words, only labor re-
turns (wages) would be taxed. Capital returns (interest, dividends, capital
gains, etc.) would not be taxed.
A wage tax, including the individual portion of the so-called flat tax,
can produce the identical result to another kind of consumption tax, usu-
ally called a cash-flow consumption tax. Under a cash-flow consumption
tax, all cash flows (and, presumably, consumption received in kind that
would be included in the tax base under current law, such as free housing
48. See id. at 293.
49. See ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995).
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and meals that are not excludable under § 119 and fringe benefits that are
not excludable under § 132) are generally included in the tax base. For
example, all the following would be initially included: wages, borrowed
money, the entire "amount realized" on the sale of business and invest-
ment assets, as well as "gain" realized (the amount over basis) on con-
sumption assets sold for more than they cost the taxpayer.50 Any amount
that is not spent on consumption is then deducted from the tax base, in-
cluding repayments of principal and interest on loans and the purchase of
investments, leaving only amounts spent on consumption in the tax base.
Of course, there are sticky questions of categorization. (Is the purchase of
a durable consumer asset that maintains or even increases in value, such
as a home, an "investment"? What about human capital outlays, i.e., edu-
cation outlays? Would students be taxed on the amount borrowed for
college in the year of receipt, with no offsetting deduction for the tuition
paid? How could students pay the resulting tax bill?) But the intent is,
generally speaking, to tax only amounts spent on consumption and not
amounts added to savings.
While they look superficially quite different, a wage tax on labor re-
turns and a cash-flow consumption tax can reach the same results (under
certain-admittedly improbable-conditions, such as identical invest-
ment returns, no significant inflation, and no change in tax rates over
time). The only difference is that the tax comes at the front end under a
wage tax and at the back end under a cash-flow consumption tax.
To illustrate, assume that Jane has $100,000 from her wages to invest,
that the interest (and discount) rate is 10% compounded annually, that
the tax rate is 30%, and that Jane holds the $100,000 investment for one
year, at which time the total net return (income and principal after tax) is
consumed. Compare the results below under both a cash-flow consump-
tion tax and a wage tax.51
50. The original purchase price of the consumption asset, if not considered an invest-
ment purchase, would not have been deductible in the year of purchase (and thus would
have been taxed by virtue of remaining in the tax base), but any appreciation in value will
not have been taxed to the taxpayer. Thus, it would be necessary to retain the concept of
"basis" for personal consumption assets that are later sold, with the appreciation entering
into the tax base at that time.
For example, assume that a diamond engagement ring purchased for $20,000 is classified
as a "consumption asset," since it is used primarily for personal purposes. The $20,000
purchase price would be nondeductible and thus would be taxed in the year of purchase
(by remaining in the tax base). If the marriage goes sour and the ring later sold for $30,000
because of appreciation, $10,000 would have to be included in the tax base in the year of
sale. Thus, the concept of "basis" would have to be retained for consumer assets that might
be later sold for more than their purchase price.
Compare this to the purchase of stock for $20,000, which is later sold for $30,000. The
$20,000 purchase price would be deductible in the year of purchase, since stock is clearly
an investment asset, and thus there would be no basis. When sold for $30,000, the entire
$30,000 would enter the tax base.
51. JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE &
POLICY 473-75 (2d ed. 1999).
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Cash Flow Consumption Tax
Gross Wages Invested (fully deductible) $100,000
Tax on Invested Wages (30%) 0
Net Investment After Tax 100,000
Gross Return ($100,000 + [.10 x $100,000]) 110,000
Tax (30%) 33,000
Net Return $ 77,000
Wage Tax
Gross Wages Available for Investment $100,000
Tax on Wages (30%) 30,000
Net Investment After Tax 70,000
Gross Return ($70,000 + [.10 x $70,000]) 77,000
Tax (30%) on Gross Return 0
Net Return $ 77,000
They are the same. 52 Therefore, one way to think about the difference
between pure consumption taxation and pure income taxation is that con-
sumption taxation effectively taxes labor returns but frees capital (which
is heavily concentrated in the top 1%, as discussed in the next section)
from taxation, whereas income taxation taxes both returns to labor and
returns to capital.
This brief exercise illustrates how any provision in our so-called income
tax that either allows the immediate deduction of a capital expenditure or
exempts the return to savings from tax is a consumption tax feature of
our hybrid income/consumption tax, and there are many significant ones.
Some of the most important include: the deferral of tax on unrealized
appreciation (which is economically equivalent to including the apprecia-
tion in the tax base and allowing an immediate offsetting deduction, as
under a cash-flow consumption tax), § 219 traditional IRA contributions,
§ 401(a) qualified pension plan contributions, § 408A Roth IRA contri-
butions, the deferral of life insurance inside buildup, the § 121 exemption
on home-sale gain, the § 103 exemption for state and local bond interest,
and § 179 expensing. More subtle consumption tax features include accel-
erated depreciation and the reduced tax rate for net capital gain (which
would be wholly tax free under a consumption tax, if attributable to an
investment asset).
52. And they result in a lower tax than under a pure income tax, under which capital
expenditures for the purchase of an investment are nondeductible:
Income Tax
Gross Wages Available for Investment $100,000
Tax on Wages (30%) $ 30,000
Net Investment After Tax $ 70,000
Gross Return ($70,000 + [.10 x $70,0001) $ 77,000
Tax on $7,000 "Income" ($77,000 - $70,000 basis) $ 2,100
Net Return $ 74,900
Id. at 472.
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Some of these features have income limits that preclude the very
wealthy from sheltering all of their savings from taxation. "Because the
large majority of low- and middle-income taxpayers can shelter most of
their savings from tax through qualified pension plans, IRAs, homeown-
ership, and life insurance, it is not farfetched to say that a majority of
Americans already operate under a consumption tax regime, while the
affluent, whose savings exceed the limits allowed under (some of) the tax-
preferred vehicles, operate under an income tax."'53 Actually, since the
lower and middle classes can shelter their savings from taxation without
including borrowed money in the tax base (and then deducting repay-
ments), one could say that they get better than consumption tax treatment
under current law (though, again, at a higher tax rate than is commonly
perceived when payroll taxes are considered). Should we extend full con-
sumption tax treatment to the very wealthy? That's the billion-dollar
question.
This essay serves as a brief book review, of sorts, of two books written
by respected tax academics 54 for the general population, each of which
advocates fundamental tax reform of different sorts. I first discuss Ed-
ward J. McCaffery's Fair Not Flat and then turn to Michael Graetz's The
Decline (and Fall?) of the Income Tax. In brief, McCaffery advocates re-
placing the income tax, as well as the estate and gift tax, with a cash flow
consumption tax with graduated rates. He would maintain the payroll
taxes, and though he mentions retaining business taxes (of some sort, not
detailed) in his book, he has since advocated simply repealing the corpo-
rate tax as well.5 5 My concerns with his proposal are many, but I focus
here chiefly on the undocumented (and potentially dramatic) nature of
how a cash flow consumption tax-even one With graduated rates-could
affect the amount of tax paid (and the wealth accumulated) by the top
1% of wealth owners. Focusing on the top 1% might seem myopic-after
all, the number "1%" seems so picayune-but that small segment of the
population pays more than 33% of the tax collected under our hybrid
income/consumption tax, and it owns nearly 40% of the private wealth in
this country. The top 1% is tremendously important for a myriad of rea-
sons, much more so than the number "1%" might suggest. They are dif-
ferent from the rest of the population in critically important ways that
should be considered in any discussion of replacing the current tax system
with a cash flow consumption tax. (As a subsidiary issue, I can't help also
criticizing the manner in which McCaffery tries to sell his proposal to the
public, painting fantastic (and misleading) pictures of who pays tax in this
country, which can do more harm than good in the long run.)
53. Id. at 482 n.14.
54. Edward J. McCaffery is the Maurice Jones, Jr., Professor of Law at the University
of Southern California Law School. Michael J. Graetz is the Justin S. Hotchkiss Professor
of Law at the Yale Law School.
55. See Edward J. McCaffery, Remove a Major Incentive to Cheat, WALL ST. J., July 9,
2002, at B2.
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Michael Graetz focuses on removing a large number of income tax
filers from the system by enacting a VAT and retaining the income tax
only for those earning above $75,000 to $100,000 or so (depending on
how the numbers crunch out). I think his idea of removing the average
wage earner (the median household income in this country is about
$50,000)56 from the burdens of filing is terribly important, but I have seri-
ous qualms about his suggested method of doing so. For reasons I'll detail
later, I think it is important to maintain a single tax system applicable to
all taxpayers. (Indeed, I have advocated integrating the existing payroll
tax burden on labor income with the income tax burden on labor in-
come.) 57 But his fundamental objective is a sound one, and we ought to
further explore ways of removing large segments of the lower and middle
classes from the burden of filing a tax return under a single (or at least
integrated) tax system, even if the tax paid by them remains unchanged.
I. STATISTICS ON THE TOP ONE PERCENT AND THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE TAX BURDEN
To place my most pressing qualms about McCaffery's book into con-
text, I need to convey important information about the top 1% of house-
holds in terms of wealth and income, as well as describe my personal tax
"ideology." I'll return and discuss evidence regarding the behavior of the
top 1% in Part II, below.
A. THE Top ONE PERCENT IN VARIOUS SNAPSHOTS
The top 1% is incredibly important, because this segment paid more
than a third of the personal income tax in 1999, as shown in Figure 1.58
The bottom 50% paid less than 5% of the total.
Figure 1 illustrates that the income tax share of the top 1% has in-
creased between 1986 and 1999, but-to place that information into con-
text-Figure 2 depicts the percentage share of income of the top 1% and
the bottom 50%, respectively, and shows how the increased tax share was
accompanied by an increased share of income, while the percentage in-
come share of the bottom 50% decreased. The year 1999
56. See Peter T. Kilborn, Mobile Home Owners Remain House Hungry, N.Y. TIMES,
July 11, 2002, at A19.
57. See Geier, supra note 29.
58. To be precise, the returns in the top 1% paid 36.2% of total income tax. Michael
Parisi & Dave Campbell, Individual Income Tax Rates and Shares 1999, in 21 STAT. IN-
COME BULL. 6, 14-15 (2002).
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Figure 1: Percentage Share of Total Income Tax59
Tax year
U Top 1 percent El Bottom 50 percent
marks the fifth consecutive year that the income shares of the top 1
percent of taxpayers were higher than the corresponding shares of
the bottom 50 percentile. The income share for the top 1 percent of
taxpayers grew to the largest it has been in the previous 13 years,
reaching 20.3 percent for 1999, while the bottom 50 percent of tax-
payers reported the lowest share of income over the corresponding
period at 13 percent. This constitutes the largest difference in income
shares between the two percentile groups over the previous 14 years,
7.3 percentage points. 60
59. Id. at 16.
60. Id. at 15.
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Figure 2: Percentage Share of Income 6'
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.Tax year
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Moreover, even though the amount of income tax raised from the top
1% increased over this term, the average income tax rate (tax paid divided
by total income) of the top 1% decreased from 33.13% in 1986 to 27.53%
in 1999 (though higher than the 1990 low of 23.25%).62 Finally, as Figure
3 shows, the after-tax share of income between 1977 and 1999 increased
for the top 1% by 115% and decreased for the bottom 20% by 9%.
Figure 3: Change in After-Tax Family Income, 1977-9963
Bottom Second Middle Fourth Top ° %
20% 120% T20% 120%1
-9% +1% +8% +14% +43% +115%
61. Id. at 16.
62. Id. at 35.
63. Inequality.org, Facts and Figures, tbl.2.2, at http://www.inequality.org/facts3.html
(citing the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, The Widening Income Gulf, Sept. 4,
1999, at http://www.cbpp.org/9-4-99tax-rep.html, which cites Congressional Budge Office
data).
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So even though the absolute percentage of revenue raised under the
personal income tax from the top 1% has increased, its share of after-tax
income has increased even more. In other words, both pre-tax and after-
tax income disparity has increased. Edward N. Wolff, an economist at
New York University who has done much valuable work in documenting
these trends, put it this way:
[T]he greatest gains in real income over the period from 1982 to 1997
were households in the top one percent of the income distribution,
who saw their incomes grow by 44 percent. Mean incomes increased
by 21 percent for the next highest four percent and by 10 percent for
the next highest 5 percent. Groups in the bottom 80 percent of the
income distribution all experienced less than 6 percent real growth in
income. Of the total growth in real income between 1982 and 1997,
47 percent was received by the top one percent and 88 percent by the
top quintile, with [the] remaining 12 percent distributed among the
bottom 80 percent.64
Using projections for 2000, the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion estimated that the percentage of federal revenue paid by the top 1%
plummets from about a third to about 18.6% when all federal taxes are
considered, including the regressive Social Security and Medicare taxes.65
Since almost as much revenue is raised under the payroll taxes as under
the personal income tax,66 this comparison makes plain that it is the per-
sonal income tax (as well as, I would add, the estate tax) that clearly is
responsible for the progressivity of the federal tax burden.67 Therefore,
any income tax proposal that would significantly affect the top 1% can
significantly affect the distribution of the aggregate tax burden and can-
perhaps more important-significantly affect the disproportionate ac-
cumulation of wealth (and its power) in a tiny minority.
How much income do you need to be in the top 1%? Are members of
that group really that much apart from the median household income of
about $50,000? The answer is yes. Not only does the top 1% earn far
more than the median household, but the top 1% looks very different
from even those in the next richest 4%. The "typical" American probably
lives down the street from someone in the 95th percentile of income earn-
ers. The top 1% is truly a class unto itself. To be in the richest 5% in 1996,
you needed an income of at least $145,412-your average successful doc-
64. EDWARD N. WOLFF, RECENT TRENDS IN WEALTH OWNERSHIP, 1983-1998, at 5-6
(Jerome Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper No. 300, 2000), at http://www.levy.org/
docs/wrkpap/papers/300.html.
65. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N, DISTRIBUTION OF CERTAIN FEDERAL TAX LIA-
BILITIES BY INCOME CLASS FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2000, 3, JCS-45-00 (2002). McCaffery
does not propose any changes in the payroll taxes.
66. See Geier, supra note 29, at 23.
67. It's worth noting here that, in the 1990s, the states significantly decreased the per-
centage of revenue collected through progressive income taxes and significantly increased
the percentage collected through regressive sales taxes (i.e., consumption taxes). See
Nicholas Johnson & Daniel Tenny, The Rising Regressivity of State Taxes (Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, 2002), at http://www.cbpp.org/1-15-02sfp.pdf.
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tor or lawyer-but to be in the richest 1%, you needed a threshold in-
come of more than twice that amount-at least $349,438, by one measure
published in 1997.68 By another measure published in 2001: "[A] family
of four would these days need an income of more than $400,000, and
average income of all families in this category is over $600,000 in 1999
dollars.'"69
A pungent anecdotal example of this phenomenon is the radically di-
vergent rates of pay increase between the average worker and the aver-
age Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a publicly traded corporation over
the last 30 years.
Over the past 30 years most people have seen only modest salary
increases: the average annual salary in America, expressed in 1998
dollars (that is, adjusted for inflation), rose from $32,522 in 1970 to
$35,864 in 1999. That's about a 10 percent increase over 29 years-
progress, but not much. Over the same period, however, according
to Fortune magazine, the average real annual compensation of the
top 100 CEOs went from $1.3 million-39 times the pay of the aver-
age worker-to $37.5 million, more than 1,000 times the pay of ordi-
nary workers.70
Even those within the top 1% itself saw increasing income concentra-
tion. Using data examining the last 30 years, Thomas Piketty and Em-
manuel Saez reported that
60 percent of the gains of that top 1 percent went to the top 0.1 per-
cent, those with incomes of more than $790,000. And almost half of
those gains went to a mere 13,000 taxpayers, the top 0.01 percent,
who had an income of at least $3.6 million and an average income of
$17 million. . .. That meant that the 13,000 richest families in
America had almost as much income as the 20 million poorest house-
holds; those 13,000 families had incomes 300 times that of average
families. 71
And this is a recent phenomenon. "[I]n 1987 the top 0.01 percent earned
only about 40 percent of what they do today, and top executives less than
a fifth as much." '72
"Wealth and income are strongly correlated . .. ,"73 and the dramatic
difference in income thresholds between the top 1% and even the top 5%
corresponds to an even more dramatic difference in wealth accumulation
(assets less liabilities). As shown in Figure 4, the top 1% owns nearly 40%
of private wealth in this country, while the bottom 40% owns a mere
0.2%. Remember that most, if not all, of the savings of the lower and
68. See LAURENCE S. SEIDMAN, THE USA TAX 35 (1997).
69. JOEL SLEMROD & JOHN BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE
GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 58 (2d ed. 2000).
70. Paul Krugman, For Richer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002, at Magazine, 62, 64.
71. Id. at 65.
72. Id.
73. WOLFF, supra note 64, at 11.
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middle classes are already exempt from taxation under the consumption
tax features of our hybrid income/consumption tax.
Figure 4: Distribution of Net Worth, 199874
40-59%
4.5%
60-79%
11.9%
Bottom 40%
0.2%
bTop 1%
38.1 %
80-89%
12.5%
90-95%
11.5%
96-99%
21.3%
Moreover, as Figure 5 shows, the top 1% 's share of wealth increased from
33.8% in 1983 to 38.1% in 1998, while the bottom 40%'s share decreased
from 0.9% to 0.2% during the same period.
Figure 5: Distribution of Net Worth, 1983 to 199875
Wealth Class 1983 1989 1992 1995 1998
Top 1% 33.8 37.4 37.2 38.5 38.1
Next 4% 22.3 21.6 22.8 21.8 21.3
Next 5% 12.1 11.6 11.8 11.5 11.5
Next 10% 13.1 13.0 12.0 12.1 12.5
Next 20% 12.6 12.3 11.5 11.4 11.9
Middle 20% 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.5 4.5
Bottom 40% 0.9 -0.7 0.4 0.2 0.2
74. Inequality.org, Facts and Figures, tbl.1.1, at http://www.inequality.org/facts2.html
(citing WOLFF, supra note 64, at tbl.2).
75. Id.
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In other words, the top 1% owns about the same amount of wealth
(38.1%) as the bottom 95% (40.6%). And the changes in marketable
wealth accrued disproportionately to the top 1%. Between 1983 and
1998, "the richest one percent received 53 percent of the total gain in
marketable wealth. The next 19 percent received another 39 percent, so
that the top quintile together accounted for 91 percent of the total growth
in wealth, while the bottom 80 percent accounted for 9 percent. '76 Dis-
played more graphically, Figure 6 shows changes in net worth in percent-
age terms between 1983 and 1998.
Figure 6: Change in Average Household Net Worth, 1983-199877
42.2%
20.7% 23.7% 20.8% 21.4%
10.0%
Tr
-76.3%
Bottom Middle Next Next
40% 20% 20% 10%
Next Next
5% 4%
Figure 7 shows changes in wealth concentration in the top 1% since the
high of 1929 and the lows of the mid-1970s.
76. WOLFF, supra note 64, at 5.
77. Id. at tbl.3.
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Figure 7: Percentage Share of HouseholdWealth Held by Top 1%,
1922-199878
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Though Figure 7 goes only through 1998, Wolff confirmed in 2002 that
"wealth in America is more highly concentrated today than at any time
since 1929 .... ,,79
How much wealth (assets less liabilities) did one need to make the top
1% in 1998? The threshold was $3,352,100, while the average was
$10,204,000; the average net worth of the bottom 40% was $1,900 (while
the threshold was, of course, negative, with many in the bottom 40% ow-
ing more in debts than they owned in assets). 80 Median household wealth
was either $71,600 or $60,700, depending on whom you ask, 81 while mean
wealth was about $270,000, which "implies that the vast bulk of house-
hold wealth is concentrated in the richest families." 82
Finally, any proposal to free entirely from taxation the returns to capi-
tal (unless spent) requires that we consider how concentrated the owner-
ship already is of stocks, mutual funds, and retirement accounts. After all,
we are not starting from a clean slate, with every taxpayer starting out
78. Inequality.org, Facts and figures, tbl.1.4, at http://www.inequality.org/facts2.htmi
(citing information in Edward N. Wolff, New Series Household Data, 78-79, for years 1922-
1989, and WOLFF, supra note 64, at tbl.2, for years 1992-1998).
79. See David Cay Johnston, More Get Rich and Pay Less in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
2002, at A17.
80. See WOLFF, supra note 64, at tbl.3 and note to tbl.5.
81. The $60,700 figure comes from WOLFF, supra note 64, at tbl.1. The $71,600 figure
was computed by Arthur B. Kennickel of the Federal Reserve Board. See Recent Changes
in Family Finances: Results from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RESERVE
BULL. (Jan. 2000), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2000/0100lead.pdf.
82. WOLFF, supra note 64, at 4.
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with a proportionate amount of such assets. Once again, the top 1% owns
the lion's share, 42.1% as of 1998, as illustrated in Figure 8.
Figure 8: Share of Total Ownership of Stocks, Mutual Funds, and
Retirement Accounts, 199883
Bottom 90%
21.3%
Top 1%
42.1%
Next 9%
36.6%
"Between 1989 and 1998, nearly 35 percent of all stock market gains
went to the top 1 percent of shareholders. '84 Moreover, "[m]iddle-class
families enjoyed 2.8 percent of the stock market gains between 1989 and
1998, but accounted for 38.8 percent of the increase in household debt."'85
As Wolff summarized the data, "[t]hese results indicate rather dramati-
cally that the growth in the economy during the period from 1983 to 1998
was concentrated in a surprisingly small part of the population-the top
20 percent and particularly the top 1 percent."'86 During this time period,
"the top one percent received 53 percent of the total growth in net worth,
56 percent of the total growth in financial wealth, and 47 percent of the
total increase in income."'87 "There has been almost no trickle down of
economic growth to the average family: almost all the growth in house-
83. Id. at tbl.6.
84. Inequality.org, Facts and Figures, note to tbl.1.13, at http://www.inequality.org/
facts2.html (citing the Economic Policy Institute).
85. Id.
86. WOLFF, supra note 64, at 6.
87. Id. at 15.
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hold income and wealth has accrued to the richest 20 percent. '88
B. MY PERSONAL IDEOLOGY
In his wonderful book, The Ideologies of Taxation,89 Louis Eisenstein
warns us that, "like all ideologies, [ideologies regarding the distribution
of the tax burden] are presented as bodies of objective truth which only
the prejudiced or benighted can fail to approve."90 Certainly, Edward
McCaffery comes across as such a true believer, as I'll describe in the
next part. But perhaps I really shouldn't be too hard on him, as I (no
doubt) am guilty of the same failing. I have my own ideology regarding
the just distribution of the tax burden, which is that the top 1% ought to
bear a goodly portion of the tax burden-even if they don't spend a lot-
because they benefit disproportionately (as measured by dollars) from
the regulated capitalist system paid for by tax revenue.
Of course, we can all disagree about what a "goodly portion" means,
but for present purposes, my concern is that the income tax burden on
the top 1% not be diminished from its present levels, accepting it as the
"right" benchmark. Perhaps it should be higher, with some of the burden
of the squeezed middle class shifted to it, but it should not be lower.
When both payroll taxes and income taxes are considered, those house-
holds with income below $50,000 per year (approximately the median in-
come) have seen their aggregate federal tax burden increase between
1979 and 1999, while upper-income households experienced a tax de-
crease. 91 These numbers will become even more pungent when the phase-
in of the 2001 tax act, which decreases marginal income tax rates for the
wealthy and repeals the estate tax, is complete. While the top 1% of
wealth holders now owns nearly 40% of the private wealth in this coun-
try, it pays less than 20% of the aggregate federal tax burden, when all
taxes are considered (including the regressive payroll taxes). 92
At bottom, I believe that someone earning $500,000 of income and sav-
ing $400,000 while spending $100,000 on personal consumption in a year
should not pay merely the same federal tax as someone earning $100,000
who spends it all on personal consumption. (Actually, if the $500,000 and
$100,000 consists entirely of labor income, the payroll taxes add an addi-
tional 15.3% tax to the first $85,000 only of each taxpayer, with earnings
above that amount taxed at only a 2.9% rate, which makes the lower
earner even worse off, comparatively speaking.)
To me, the bottom-line question is: How should the costs of maintaining
a regulated capitalist economy, with its laws of supply and demand that
create wealth, be allocated among the members of the population? In my
view, essentially all tax revenue goes toward paying the costs of maintain-
88. Id. at 16.
89. Louis EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION (1961).
90. Id. at iii.
91. See Geier, supra note 29, at 23.
92. See supra note 65 and accompanying text and fig.4.
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ing a regulated capitalist economy-even that tax revenue that funds
transfer payments, such as Social Security payments to the elderly and
Medicaid payments to the poor. (It is for this reason that I argue it would
be defensible to repeal the earnings cap under the Social Security tax,
coupled with a slashing of tax rates under that tax, as an alternative to full
integration of the two taxes.)9 3 Therefore, the costs of paying for that
system should be allocated across the population at least in proportion to
the money benefits extracted under that system. 94 The person earning
$500,000 per year is able to do so only because he or she lives in a regu-
lated capitalist system and can exploit the market to sell products or ser-
vices. That $500,000 is not earned by the individual in a vacuum; it is-
perhaps in very large part-made possible by our system of laws (where
contracts will be enforced), our education system, a functioning court sys-
tem, functioning transportation and technology systems, a military com-
plex, etc., etc., etc. As Bill Gates's dad said in support of the estate tax:
"It is a very legitimate claim of society on an accumulation of wealth
which would not have occurred without an orderly market, free education
and incredible dollars spent on research. '95
For a person who earns $500,000 per year to be protected from paying
any of the costs of the system under which such wealth accumulation was
made possible, so long as he avoids spending money, seems indefensible
to me. It allows the accumulation of wealth, made possible by capitalism,
without paying for the costs of supporting capitalism. It is not an answer
to me to say that he will pay some of the costs someday-just as soon as
he spends. It is basic economic doctrine that, because of the time value of
money, deferral of tax is tantamount to reduction, if not complete for-
giveness. 96 Thus, delay can allow greater concentrations and disparities in
wealth than would otherwise occur, since funds can grow on a pre-tax
basis, as can occur in a qualified pension plan afforded consumption tax
treatment for the middle class. The tax event, beyond the basic tax-de-
ferred savings of the middle class, should ideally be at the time of wealth
accumulation, in my view. Sometimes, practical considerations require
delay (such as with the realization requirement), but as soon as it is possi-
ble (e.g., not later than death), that delayed tax should be paid.
I realize that this is an idiosyncratic ideology, as it, in effect, can be said
to meld the "benefit" theory of tax justice with the "ability to pay" the-
ory, when the "ability to pay" theory has traditionally been perceived as a
93. See generally Geier, supra note 29, at 11, 25, 42, 65.
94. I do not go so far as to say that government precedes all income earning, as appar-
ently do Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE
MYTH OF OWNERSHIP (2002). Even in anarchy, with no structured government, people can
bargain (even though without the support of a court structure to enforce contracts, etc.)
and accumulate wealth and economic power to some extent.
95. Carl Huse, Battle on Estate Tax: How Two Well-Organized Lobbies Sprang Into
Action, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2002, at A27.
96. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 51, at 467-72, 618-19.
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rejection of the "benefit" theory. 97 On the other hand, it seems to be
consistent with the thinking of the influential German theorist Georg
Schanz, whom Utz describes as insisting "on economic power (wirtschaf-
tliche Kraft) as the ultimate measure of 'pure' taxable capacity (rein wirt-
schaftliche Vermogen), and argued that these concepts should be
understood without reference to the idiosyncratic preference satisfaction
of the individual who enjoyed or wielded the economic power at issue."'98
In other words, I (like Schanz) do not argue for allocation of the tax bur-
den under utilitarian principles by arguing that the tax burden ought to
be apportioned in such a way that utility or well-being (however mea-
sured) might be least damaged. The costs of our regulated capitalist sys-
tem are measured in nominal dollars (however one perceives the utility
associated with those dollars), and those costs should be allocated at least
proportionately (and arguably even disproportionately) to those with
greater dollars since those dollars are, perhaps to a very great extent,
made possible by the economic system, the costs of which are being ap-
portioned. In other words, you might say that I focus on economic power
rather than utility. That's why poor people don't pay, even though they
can be said to "benefit" from the system, as well. The "benefit" obtained
from our regulated capitalist system is, for this purpose, measured by the
economic power (i.e., dollars) created by it.
Of course, this formulation does absolutely nothing to solve the conun-
drum posed by utility theory itself, which is precisely "how progressive" it
is defensible to make the tax system. Nevertheless, it does (at least in my
ideology) support extracting a greater tax from the person who earns
$500,000 of wealth in our regulated capitalist economy (and spends only
$100,000 of it) than from the person who earns $100,000 and spends it all.
The person who is fortunate enough to earn $500,000 rather than
$100,000 because of the laws of supply and demand ought to pay more of
the cost of the system that allows the laws of supply and demand to oper-
ate (as opposed to, say, a system of central planning).
Two consequences of such an allocation are also important to me.
They are the protection of regulated capitalism as well as the avoidance
of plutocracy. I am a fan of regulated capitalism. I think that it is superior,
warts and all, to any other economic system that humans have thus far
concocted. But I do not think that it would prosper well in a country
where the top 1% that profits so disproportionately from having such a
system in place does not pay a disproportionate share of the costs of that
system. At the other end of the spectrum, I also fear the political and
democratic ramifications of further concentration of economic power in
so small a portion of the population. It's not so much that I fear that the
super wealthy can buy off individual politicians in a sinister fashion
(though that may happen, too). Even more insidious is their ability, as
97. "Proponents of taxation according to benefit, sometimes called the 'equivalence
principle,' traditionally reject the ability to pay approach." Utz, supra note 27, at 867 n.2.
98. Id. at 909.
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Witte noted in 1985, to influence the terms of public debate through the
"bias in favor of economic power." 99 Even with perfect good faith and
the best of intentions in trying to advance what he or she believes to be
the "best" road for the country to follow, the mere fact that the person
with great wealth can have a disproportionate effect on public opinion
through the deployment of money (often through tax-exempt founda-
tions) is troublesome in terms of democratic principles.
[Riather than using coercive power, economic elites exercise power
by controlling values and limiting the scope of alternatives consid-
ered in public decisions (i.e., by limiting the definition of what is po-
litically possible). This control of the "agenda," which serves to limit
the bounds of government action, is not seriously opposed because
of mass inculcation of capitalist values.100
A provocative recent example is the movement to repeal the estate tax,
an extremely progressive tax applicable to fewer than 2% of decedents,
which reaches primarily appreciation in the value of property that is
never taxed under the income tax. In other words, it's a tax on capital
that serves chiefly to prevent the realization requirement under the in-
come tax from allowing built-in gain to go untaxed generation after gen-
eration (which, by the way, McCaffery's tax would allow, as will be
described). As recounted by Paul Krugman:
[M]uch of the general public has been convinced that the estate
tax is a bad thing. If you try talking about the tax to a group of mod-
erately prosperous retirees, you get some interesting reactions. They
refer to it as the "death tax"; many of them believe that their estates
will face punitive taxation, even though most of them will pay little
or nothing; they are convinced that small businesses and family farms
bear the brunt of the tax.
These misconceptions don't arise by accident. They have, instead,
been deliberately promoted. For example, a Heritage Foundation
document titled "Time to Repeal Federal Death Taxes: The
Nightmare of the American Dream" emphasizes stories that rarely,
if ever, happen in real life: "Small-business owners, particularly mi-
nority owners, suffer anxious moments wondering whether the busi-
nesses they hope to hand down to their children will be destroyed by
the death tax bill ... Women whose children are grown struggle to
find ways to re-enter the work force without upsetting the family's
estate tax avoidance plan." And who finances the Heritage Founda-
tion? Why, foundations created by wealthy families, of course.
This obviously raises the possibility of a self-reinforcing process.
As the gap between the rich and the rest of the population grows,
economic policy increasingly caters to the interests of the elite, while
public services for the population at large-above all, public educa-
tion-are starved of resources. As policy increasingly favors the in-
99. WrrrE, supra note 3, at 13.
100. Id.
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terests of the rich and neglects the interests of the general
population, income disparities grow even wider. 10 1
The most common fairness complaint of the economic elites of progres-
sive taxes is that they (or their ancestors) 10 2 "earned" their money, fair
and square, and thus they "deserve" to keep it at the same rate as the
little guy. And apparently they are convincing some of their less-well-off
brethren of this.
[I]n decades far past, one's good fortune was taken, in part at least,
as just that-as "good fortune"-in part due to luck or good genes or
being in the right place at the right time in the right country in the
right era. Progressive taxation.., was not uncommonly viewed as an
appropriately larger contribution to the public fisc to support the ec-
onomic and social environment-a regulated capitalist system-that
makes such top-heavy wealth acquisition possible in the first place.
That doesn't seem to be the case anymore. It seems to me that
Americans more and more feel that whatever wealth comes under
their control is attributable to their own hard work and merit, and
even the wealthy are viewed by the nonwealthy as having "earned"
their wealth. One recent Gallup poll, for example, found that 53%
believed that the rich are rich because of "strong effort," while only
32% credited "luck" or "circumstances beyond [their] control." And
Lawrence Lindsey ... has said that "the envy argument ... carries a
lot less weight than it used to [because Americans] have a sense that
those who have money today have earned it. ' °103
But this notion that one's returns (whether on capital or labor) is indic-
ative of "dessert" is misguided. As Alan Gunn succinctly put it:
As a fan of a market economy, I am amazed at the number of people
who think that prices (including wages) are supposed to measure
what people "deserve." Prices are determined by supply and de-
mand, period (absent government intervention, to be sure). Markets
do what they do-mainly, putting information to use-very well. But
one of the things they don't do is give people what they deserve.
Complaining about this makes about as much sense as complaining
that the laws of physics are unfair.104
101. Krugman, supra note 70, at 141.
102. [N]early 40% of the Forbes 400 in 1999 achieved their wealth the easy way:
they inherited it, with this 40% slice inheriting on average $2.5 billion each.
Or as the Economist magazine put it in 1998: "In many cases the rich have
got richer by doing rather little. An American who had $500,000 in shares
and a $500,000 New York apartment fifteen years ago, and has merely held
on to them, is now $5 million better off." Wealth begets wealth, sometimes
without much effort, which has perhaps contributed in part to the increasing
wealth concentration in this country ....
Deborah A. Geier, The Death of the "Death Tax?": An Introduction, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
653, 656 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
103. Id.
104. E-mail submission from Alan Gunn, Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School,
to Taxprof, a closed Internet discussion group for tax law professors at AALS-accredited
law schools (Apr. 24, 2002) (copy on file with author).
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In other words, it is not at all clear that a high-school physics teacher
"deserves" to be paid only, say, $40,000 per year, while a CEO of a pub-
licly traded company "deserves" to be paid, say, $100 million per year.
The labor market for CEOs is (apparently) very tight for them to com-
mand such stratospheric salaries. Since supply and demand-our regu-
lated capitalist system-is what allows the CEO to command such a
salary (and not necessarily "dessert"), it should not be considered unfair
to demand that the CEO pay an outsized portion of the costs of that
regulated capitalist system from those outsized returns. Or-even
worse-these super-sized salaries may contain super-sized rents, accord-
ing to Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker. According to their analysis, "many
(not a few) top executives are skimming mighty rents-incomes in excess
of what market efficiency and maximum shareholder value would dic-
tate-from the people who employ them.' 10 5 It might be impossible to
prevent such rent extraction, but it shouldn't be considered unfair to
more heavily tax it.
Similarly, the large salary that entertainer Jennifer Lopez (who my
nieces tell me is called J.Lo by those in the know) can demand may be
partly a function of the fact that all things Latina are hot right now in the
cultural zeitgeist. 10 6 (I understand that even Raquel Welch has reclaimed
her Latina roots.) 10 7 If that fashion should pass, J.Lo and Raquel might
have to be satisfied with less pay, but their singing and acting talent (?)
presumably will not have changed. 108 The laws of supply and demand-
the capitalist economy-are surely responsible at least in part for these
changes in return, both the upside and the downside. (Indeed, I believe
that most people are quick to blame the economy or shifting tastes if their
pay is reduced, while if their pay is increased due to the effects of supply
and demand, they attribute the increase rather to their own personal ef-
fort and talent.)
This line of reasoning becomes even more persuasive in the context of
what Robert Frank and Philip Cook have called winner-take-all mar-
kets, 10 9 which they contend are growing more prevalent.
105. Economics Focus: Taken for a Ride, THE ECONOMIST, July 13, 2002, at 64 (describ-
ing Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Exec-
utive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 751 (2002)).
106. Cf. Cartoon in the NEW YORKER magazine, July 29, 2002, at 64. The scene: a fusty
middle-aged couple in their living room, the husband sitting in an overstuffed armchair
reading the paper, the wife, trying to get her husband's attention, parading before him
dressed in an outrageously flamboyant outfit apparently intended to be evocative of Latin
America. The caption: "Just reclaiming my Latino roots."
107. See Mireya Navarro, Raquel Welch is Reinvented as a Latina, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2002, at El (noting that "Hollywood . . . now considers Latinos hip and pays Jennifer
Lopez up to $12 million a picture).
108. "If public tastes shifted and demand for their services decreased, their incomes
would decline dramatically without any change in their abilities or work effort." GRAETZ,
supra note 26, at 223.
109. See ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY
(1995).
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As described by Frank and Cook, a winner-take-all market has sev-
eral characteristics. It is one in which relative merit, as opposed to
only absolute merit, determines who wins, where differences in abso-
lute merit might actually be quite small. Think of the difference be-
tween the gold medal winner at the Olympics and the silver medalist.
Only hundredths of a second might separate them, but the financial
rewards that go to the gold medalist in endorsements, etc., are huge,
while no one remembers the silver medalist only days later.
Moreover, increasingly competitive market conditions due to many
factors, including increasing technology and the breakdown of loy-
alty within organizations, bids up the price of that relatively small
group of winners to heights not commonly seen prior to the 1980s in
spheres outside sports and entertainment. Today, the authors argue
that winner-take-all markets "have permeated law, journalism, con-
sulting, medicine, investment banking, corporate management, pub-
lishing, design, fashion, and even the hallowed halls of academe."
Whereas the median income in an increasing number of professions
has remained relatively constant, the distributions around that me-
dian have become far more pronounced, with the winners at the top
gaining a significantly higher share. The realm of pay reaped by
CEOs is one much-discussed example. "Today's average chief execu-
tive earns 475 times as much as the average factory worker, up from
a ratio of forty-two in 1980."' 110
And they, too, reiterate that the distribution of income wrought by cap-
italism does not necessarily reflect dessert.
The economist's theory of wages, which holds that workers are paid
in proportion to the value of their productive contributions, was
never intended to justify market income distributions on ethical
grounds. Nonetheless, many see a certain rough justice when pay is
distributed on that basis, for the system rewards not only talent but
also the willingness to expend effort. In winner-take-all markets,
however, pay distributions will be more spread out-often dramati-
cally so-than the underlying distributions of effort and ability. It is
one thing to say that people who work 10 percent harder or have 10
percent more talent should receive 10 percent more pay. But it is
quite another to say that such small differences should cause pay to
110. Geier, supra note 102, at 657-58 (footnotes omitted). For 2000, it was over 500 to 1.
See Q&A: Welcome to the Working Class, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2002, at A15.
In 1981, [America's 10 most highly paid CEOs] were paid an average of $3.5
million, which seemed like a lot at the time. By 1988 the average had soared
to $19.3 million, which seemed outrageous. But by 2000 the average annual
pay of the top 10 ten was $154 million. It's true that wages of ordinary work-
ers roughly doubled over the same period, though the bulk of that gain was
eaten up by inflation. But earnings of the top executives rose 4,300 percent.
Paul Krugman, Plutocracy and Politics, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2002, at A35 (summarizing
material in KEVIN PHILLIS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN RICH (2002)). Moreover, the pay of American CEOs is more than three times
that of CEOs of comparable companies in Britain and more than four times that of compa-
rable CEOs in France and Germany. See Alan B. Krueger, Economic Scene, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 2002, at C2.
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differ by 10,000 percent or more .... The realization of how winner-
take-all markets contribute to income inequality may affect the ex-
tent to which society tries to alter market distributions in the name
of fairness."'
In other words, the operation of the market itself is arguably increasingly
responsible for the increasingly outsized rewards of the very top, not des-
sert per se. And let us not forget good old-fashioned luck, patronage, and
connections."12
It is time now to turn to McCaffery's book, since he, too, professes to
be supportive of progressive taxation.
II. MCCAFFERY'S FAIR NOT FLAT TAX
In his book, which was written to convince the general public and not
the specialist, Edward McCaffery proposes repeal of both the income tax
and the estate and gift tax and enactment of a progressive rate, cash-flow
consumption tax. As best as I can glean, he seems to rely on four main
reasons in this book for selling his tax to the public: (1) to make the
wealthy pay more tax; (2) possibly to encourage economic growth; (3) to
have a moral tax base; and (4) to have a tax system that eliminates class
conflict. Each reason is discussed in the following subparts (though they
inevitably overlap here and there). But before I get there, let me de-
scribe some of his details, though they are sketchy, and I will not spend
much time on them. I also will not be spending any time on other conten-
tious issues, such as transition problems," 3 the repeal of any preference
for interest received on state and local bonds,' 4 and the loss of the spe-
cial preference for retirement savings (as compared to other savings).
His proposed tax rate schedule on spending for a household with four
people is shown below. 15 While he advocates that his tax should apply
"per household," he does not provide alternative tax schedules for, say, a
single person or a married couple with no children at home-the far more
common households in America today. Presumably, the thresholds for
each of the tax rates below would be lower for such households, trigger-
ing the higher tax rates at lower rates of spending. While he has "tried to
111. FRANK & COOK, supra note 109, at 17.
112. Cf. Paul Krugman, Steps to Wealth, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2002, at A21 (charging
that President George W. Bush "became wealthy entirely through patronage and
connections").
113. See generally Joseph Bankman & Barbara H. Fried, Winners and Losers in the Shift
to a Consumption Tax, 86 GEO. L.J. 539 (1998) (discussing transition possibilities and win-
ners and losers under each with the introduction of a cash-flow consumption tax).
114. See EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT 99 (2002) (noting "no need for...
tax-free municipal bonds"). The exemption for interest on state and local bonds is, indeed,
inefficient, losing more money than is provided in subsidy to the states, with the difference
going to the highest-bracket taxpayers. See, e.g., DODGE ET AL., supra note 51, at 323-27.
Congress has long tried to repeal the indirect subsidy and replace it with a direct cash
grant, but state and local governments have lobbied hard to retain the less efficient indirect
subsidy. They fear that a direct cash subsidy from the federal government would be subject
to reductions when money is short, while the indirect subsidy keeps the money coming.
115. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 26.
[Vol. 56
2003] INCREMENTAL VS. FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 127
make a guess at revenue neutral rates, 11 6 he also states, "All of my num-
bers are rough and only illustrative. 1 7
Spending ($) Tax Rate (%)
0 -20,000 0
20,000 - 80,000 10
80,000 - 160,000 20
160,000 - 500,000 30
500,000 - 1,000,000 40
over 1;000,000 50
Because he advocates repeal of the estate and gift tax, he explicitly
contemplates that Dad should be able to transfer funds to Daughter to
spend, and that spending will be taxed at Daughter's lower marginal tax
rate. 118 (Presumably, we would have to develop a common-law "assign-
ment-of-spending" doctrine if Dad attempts to give money to Daughter,
who lives in a separate household and who then buys Dad's personal con-
sumption for him as an in-kind gift, in order to have the spending taxed at
her lower marginal rate. On the other hand, since cash gifts would not
trigger any tax consequences under McCaffery's plan, what is to prevent
several households from lowering their aggregate marginal spending rate
by making gifts of money among themselves, which is then used to fund
consumption for the households at the lowest possible combined margi-
nal rate?)
While his book "doesn't call for eliminating or reducing business
taxes," 119 he has more recently advocated repeal of the corporate tax as
well, folding that tax into the cash-flow consumption tax.120 Since the cor-
porate tax raises approximately 12% of all federal revenue, 21 the rates
above for a family of four would have to be significantly higher (or kick
in at significantly lower spending thresholds) in order to be revenue neu-
tral. This would seem to doom his "self-imposed limitation ... never to
have a marginal tax rate over 50 percent. ' 122 These rates also contem-
plate retention of the regressive payroll taxes,' 23 and the burden of those
taxes would not be integrated into his tax through either a credit or a
116. Id. at 91.
117. Id. Alternatively, he suggests enacting an 11% VAT, which would allow lowering
the rates at each level by 10%. That is to say, the rate applicable to spending from $0 -
$20,000 for a family of four would be negative 10% (and would be administered through
sending a rebate check of $2,000 on showing consumption expenditures for a family of four
of at least $20,000); the rate applicable to spending from $20,000 to $80,000 for a family of
four would be zero (since they will have paid the 11% VAT, which is equivalent to the 10%
rate in the table); the rate applicable to spending from $80,000 to $160,000 for a family of
four would be 10%, and so on. See id. at 100-01.
118. See id. at 146.
119. Id. at 125.
120. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
121. See GRAETZ, supra note 26, at 21.
122. MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 91.
123. Id.
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deduction, though he says that "in time it might be possible to move away
from the payroll tax and to build up the progressive spending tax, '124
presumably through higher rates or lower spending thresholds for each
tax rate.
In other words, he proposes to repeal the corporate tax (which, al-
though the evidence is ambiguous, is probably a tax borne by all capi-
tal), 125 repeal the estate and gift tax (a tax on capital 126 and clearly the
most progressive element of the federal tax system, since it applies to
fewer than 2% of all decedents), retain the regressive payroll taxes on
labor income without change, replace the better-than-consumption tax
treatment currently enjoyed by the lower and middle classes (because
they can both exclude loan proceeds and exempt their savings from tax)
with less-advantageous pure consumption tax treatment, and provide
pure consumption tax treatment to the affluent, including the top 1%, as
well.
He would categorize a personal residence as an investment, so that the
inclusion of the borrowed money used to purchase the home would be
offset by a deduction of the purchase price.127 When the proceeds of the
home were sold, however, the entire sales proceeds would be included in
the tax base. Only if the proceeds were fully rolled over into another
home or other investment property would the taxpayer escape taxation
on the full amount realized. 12 8 Therefore, if a retiree sold the large family
home and chose to rent instead of buy another home, he would be taxed
on the full sales proceeds (unlike today). 129 Only if he rolled it over into
another investment would he escape taxation. The same would be true of
a divorcee who got the house in the divorce (and little else) and sold it,
rented instead, and used the money to pay living expenses, unlike under
current law. "[C]orporate shares represent, on average, less than one-fifth
of the total wealth of the vast middle of the population, with accumulated
net worth of less than $250,000, Federal Reserve data indicates. Homes,
by contrast, are far and away the major investment of these house-
holds."' 130 The repeal of the exclusion for realized home sale gain, unless
the proceeds were rolled over into another investment, would dilute the
"better-than-consumption-tax-treatment" that the broad middle class
now enjoys with respect to their most significant savings.
124. Id. at 93.
125. See Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Out-
dated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAx L. REV. 261, 302 n.170 (2001).
126. See James M. Poterba, The Estate Tax and After-Tax Investment Returns, in ATLAS,
supra note 1, at 329, 335-36 (noting that estate taxes are large enough to represent a sub-
stantial component of the capital tax burden).
127. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 134-35.
128. See id. at 135.
129. See I.R.C. § 121 (2002) (exempting from taxation realized home sale gain not in
excess of $250,000 for a single individual and $500,000 for a married couple filing a joint
return, without regard to whether the proceeds are rolled over into another home or other
investment).
130. Louis Uchitelle, Wall St. Damage Ripples Across the Population, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 2002, at 19.
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There would be no exceptions to the rule that borrowed money is in-
cluded in the tax base when received, offset by a deduction only if the
borrowed money is used to buy an investment. (Recall that middle class
households accounted for 38.8% of the increase in household debt be-
tween 1989 and 1998.)131 Therefore, a student who borrows for college
would have to include the loan proceeds in the tax base when received
and get no immediate offsetting deduction (unless tuition were catego-
rized as an investment). Indeed, anyone who is in dire financial straits
from a job layoff, etc., and for that reason has to borrow money to pay
the rent and utilities, would have to include that borrowed money in the
tax base. They would then deduct repayments, when made. In other
words, the tax bill would come when they are least able to pay it, and the
deductions would come in later (presumably better off) years. While
some would see this timing as ill-matched to taxpaying capacity over time,
McCaffery sees this as a plus. He argues that because consumption is
much more level over a lifetime, while income is bunched in the high-
earning middle years, the tax bill should be more level over a lifetime.
A progressive tax on inflows-like an income or prepaid consump-
tion tax-therefore seems unfair: it heavily taxes the high midlife
earner .... A consistent postpaid tax, on the other hand, falls on our
voluntary choice of spending level, not on the much more erratic
profile of our earnings-it chooses to tax at a better, fairer time. It
spreads the tax burden across our lifetimes .... 132
Others might conclude that since taxpaying capacity is at its highest in the
high-earning middle years, more tax should be paid then, and less tax
paid in the low-earning early years and retirement years. If "bunching" is
a big problem because of progressive rates, we could revive income aver-
aging, though it does not seem to me to be a big problem with our rela-
tively compressed tax rate schedule for the vast majority of the
population.
McCaffery repeatedly stresses the "inconsistency" of the income tax to
tax all income as its fatal flaw-in particular, the practical inability to tax
appreciation in assets until realized. 133 He talks about the importance of
being "consistent" a lot, referring constantly to a "consistent consump-
tion tax" being better than our "inconsistent income tax."1 34 Indeed, it's
for this reason that he insists that all loan proceeds must be included in
the tax base, because a theoretically pure cash flow consumption tax re-
quires it. He criticizes the Nunn-Dominici version of a cash-flow con-
sumption tax (the unlimited savings account tax, or "USA tax") on this
ground.
131. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
132. MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 17.
133. Id. at 29 (referring to the realization requirement as "the most fatal flaw of the so-
called income tax").
134. See, e.g., id. at 97 (referring to the "inconsistent" income tax and a "consistent,
progressive spending tax").
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[The USA Tax] is not, in fact, a consistent spending tax; it shares
some of the vices of the inconsistent income tax. For one thing, the
USA Tax supplements its consumption tax base with an estate tax; it
is thus a progressive consumption-plus-estate tax ....
More important, the USA Tax is inconsistent in its treatment of
debt because it fails to include the proceeds of borrowing as income.
The treatment of debt is critical to an effective tax: borrowing is a
form of negative savings or dissaving. A tax built up on the idea of
subtracting savings from income ... must add negative savings, or
borrowings, into its tax base.135
So I was surprised to read later that he supports deduction of some of
the personal consumption expenses that are allowed to be deducted
under our hybrid income/consumption tax. For example, he would sup-
port allowing deduction of extraordinary medical expenses, charitable
contributions, and perhaps some education expenses, as well as child care
expenses. 136 He does not clarify to the reader why some exceptions to
pure theory can be made under a cash-flow consumption tax but not
others, or why some exceptions can be made under a consumption tax but
not under an income tax, though perhaps he simply considers these ex-
ceptions to be de minimis and therefore unimportant. 137
A. TAXING THE Top ONE PERCENT
McCaffery is very savvy in trying to appeal to the general, middle-class
reader at whom his book is clearly aimed. He does so by telling them-
over and over again-that they are required to pay taxes but that the rich
are escaping paying any tax, that this is unfair, and that his proposal
would change this state of affairs. He starts out his book, at the very be-
ginning of the Introduction, with a quotation from a book called Rich
Dad, Poor Dad that goes like this:
"Taxes" said rich dad. "You're taxed when you earn. You're taxed
when you spend. You're taxed when you save. You're taxed when
you die."
"Why do people let the government do that to them?"
"The rich don't," said rich dad with a smile. "The poor and the mid-
dle class do. I'll bet you that I earn more than your dad, yet he pays
more in taxes."
"How can that be?" I asked. As a 9-year-old boy, that made no sense
to me."'
138
He does not tell his middle-class target audience that they are not, in
fact, taxed at the federal level when they earn and again when they
135. Id. at 58-59 (emphasis in original).
136. See id. at 155.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 1 (quoting ROBERT T. KIYOSAKI & SHARON L. LECHTER, RICH DAD, POOR
DAD (2000)).
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spend 139 and taxed when they die-that they are, in fact, eligible for bet-
ter-than-consumption tax treatment under current law and not subject to
the estate tax, with its $1 million exemption. He does not tell the reader
that the top 1% pays more than a third of the revenue under our income/
consumption tax (excluding payroll taxes), while the bottom 50% pays
less than 5%, which is hardly a case where poor dad pays more than rich
dad, as the quotation above states. He lets this misimpression fester. And
then he implies, right off, that he's going to make the rich pay more tax
and reduce wealth disparity in doing so.
We need fundamental, comprehensive tax reform, not ad hoc
tinkering.
[T]here is a widening gap between the rich and the not-rich in this
country.
It may surprise many readers to learn that there is a deep connec-
tion between these two facts. Tax as it is today is a cause of the
wealth gap. Tax as it could be tomorrow would narrow it. That's what
this book is about: a proposal to make the tax system better and
fairer so that we can get to a model of class teamwork, not class
conflict, in this great nation.140
He goes on to tell the reader:
[O]nce you have wealth, whether you earned it or were given it, you
are home-and tax-free. Life on top is very good, with ever new
and ever more expensive luxuries for you to enjoy. And with very
basic tax planning, you need never pay tax on your lavish lifestyle.
But if you are not rich, these are difficult times. Life is stressful as
you live from paycheck to paycheck, never seeming to get ahead.
And yet you are taxed at every turn.141
He also says that our tax system (and since he proposes to maintain the
payroll taxes, he is talking only about our hybrid income/consumption tax
and the estate and gift tax) makes it hard to build up wealth. Though he
directs this assertion at the middle-class reader, he does not tell him that
he essentially gets better-than-consumption tax treatment under current
law, with virtually all of his most significant savings given consumption
tax treatment while his borrowing enjoys income tax treatment (i.e., ex-
cludable when received). Moreover, he does not tell the middle-class
reader that his wealth can be passed from generation to generation with-
out tax, that fewer than 2% of decedents pay estate tax.
He talks of the "surprisingly obscure fact that paying tax has become
virtually voluntary for the growing number of Americans who have made
a fortune for themselves and can comfortably live out the rest of their
days on the yield from their property holdings. Meanwhile workers ...
139. Earnings are included in gross income, and personal consumption spending is gen-
erally nondeductible, which means that amounts that are earned and spent on consumption
are taxed only once, not twice.
140. MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 1-2.
141. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
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are taxed on all sides ....
He begins each of chapters one, two, and five with a similar quotation
from Rich Dad, Poor Dad (with the quotation preceding chapter five say-
ing "[t]he real reality is that the rich are not taxed"). 143 He begins chapter
three 144 with a quotation from Joel Slemrod's and John Bakija's Taxing
Ourselves: A Citizen's Guide to the Great Debate Over Tax Reform145 re-
garding how the U.S. income tax system is under attack, without further
letting the reader know that Slemrod and Bakija actually advise against a
cash-flow consumption tax in favor of further reform of the income
tax. 146
McCaffery implies, again and again, that the wealthy are not paying
tax. "Wealthy people and their well-paid tax advisers are even less help.
These fortunate few are doing just fine under the status quo. They have
no interest in change.' 1 47 He refers to "the brutally simple means by
which rich property owners can live well tax free. ' 148 "It hardly seems
progressive to have rich spenders bear an average tax rate of zero per-
cent.'1 49 Our tax system "allows rich and clever people like Rich Dad to
pay no taxes whatsoever. Heirs ... can acquire massive wealth early in
their lives and spend away without ever paying any tax. . . .The rich,
clever, and well-advised win. The not-rich lose."' 150 And again: "[T]he in-
consistent income tax that we do have is particularly bad because it falls
heavily on the poor dads of the nation while the rich dads delight in their
ability to evade it.'' 5 1
I wouldn't be surprised if every Joe Sixpack who read this book didn't
think that he was paying more in personal income taxes than the rich.
This is clearly the impression that McCaffery wants to convey. Nowhere
does he even hint to his reader that the top 1% pays more than a third of
personal income taxes and that the bottom 50% pays less than 5% of it
and that fewer than 2% of decedents pay estate tax. It is against his inter-
est to let them know that. He talks about the rising burden of the payroll
taxes on the middle class-which I agree is egregious-but remember
that he proposes no changes in them. He proposes to replace only the
142. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
143. See id. at 9, 27, 78.
144. See id. at 45.
145. SLEMRO & BAKIJA, supra note 69.
146. See id. at 237-56 (advocating "building a better income tax" rather than going to a
clean consumption tax).
147. MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 5. I believe he's wrong that the wealthy like the
income-and-estate-tax status quo. If it were up to them, they would go back to a world
containing only consumption taxes and no estate tax. I think that, so far, it's the middle
class that has resisted the shift downward in the tax burden that a consumption-without-
estate tax would likely provide, on average. This is just one of the ways that I think McCaf-
fery misleads the general public in this book.
148. Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 114 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 28.
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progressive portions of the federal tax system with a pure consumption
tax.
How do the rich avoid paying tax, according to McCaffery?1 5 2 The key
is the realization requirement, which provides consumption tax treatment
by failing to tax the appreciation in value of property, coupled with the
failure to include debt proceeds in the tax base, as under a pure income
tax. He is right that this is, of course, better-than-consumption tax treat-
ment. It's the same kind of better-than-consumption tax treatment en-
joyed by the middle class when they borrow money to invest in an IRA,
which has income ceilings that limit their availability to the wealthy. He
instructs his readers in "Tax Planning 101," which he teaches to his stu-
dents on the first day of class and which is premised on the deferral of
gain under the realization requirement, the tax-free step-up in basis at
death, and the borrowing exclusion:
1. Buy
2. Borrow
3. Die
That's it. By buying appreciating assets and borrowing against the
appreciation until death, the fortunate few can have the resources to
live the good life tax free. Their heirs can inherit the assets with a
stepped-up basis, sell them off, and pay off the debts. Neither the
decedents nor their heirs will pay any income tax when using this
strategy. They'll avoid paying payroll tax by the simple expedient of
not working.153
He then gives an explicit example to really rile up the reader
Meet Artful Dodger, a master of Tax Planning 101. Mr. Dodger is
fortunate enough to have $1 million at his disposal. It really doesn't
matter to us how Dodger came upon his money. Perhaps he inher-
ited it, in which case he would never pay any federal taxes on his
good fortune. Or perhaps Dodger earned his stake by working, or he
won the lottery, in which cases he as already paid an initial income
tax. In any event, now that he has his million dollars, Dodge is
through with his days as an ordinary taxpayer. Here is how he man-
ages never to pay taxes again.
Dodger invests his million in a portfolio that gains 10 percent in
value every year. In Year 1, Dodger's portfolio rises in value from
$1,000,000 to $1,100,000. Dodger borrows $100,000 at 10 percent in-
terest (leaving his net worth at $1,000,000). In Year 2, he owes
$10,000 in interest, but his portfolio has gone up another 10 percent,
or $110,000, so it is now worth $1,210,000. He borrows $110,000 more
(leaving his net wealth at $1,000,000). He uses $10,000 to pay off the
interest on his Year 1 debt and spends the remaining $100,000. In
Year 3, the portfolio again goes up 10 percent, this time $121,000,
152. I am talking about legal avoidance here. Evading tax by failing to report cash flow
at all by, say, parking it offshore would be a problem under a cash-flow consumption tax as
well as an income tax, since the first step is gross reported cash flow.
153. MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 32.
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rising from $1,210,000 to $1,331,000. He borrows $121,000 (again
leaving his wealth at $1,000,000). He uses $10,000 to pay off his Year
1 debt, $11,000 to pay off his Year 2 debt, and spends $100,000.
You get the point. Dodger will always have $100,000 to spend, and
his net wealth will always stay at $1,000,000, as long as the interest
rate on his debt matches the yield to his portfolio. And if-as one
would expect-Dodger is on average earning more on his portfolio
than he is paying on his debt, he is actually making money on the
deal, too.
The game can go on forever. As long as Dodger plays it, he will
pay no income tax, no capital gains tax, no payroll tax, and no gift
and estate tax. When he dies, his heirs can use their inheritance with
its stepped-up basis to pay off his debt. They will pay no income tax,
and Dodger's estate will also have dodged the death tax, which is a
tax on one's net estate, that is, assets minus liabilities. Dodger only
ever has one million dollars of net wealth, the current exemption
level for estate taxes. 154
In short, McCaffery at the least implies that the very rich do not pay
tax and will pay more tax under his plan than under the status quo. But is
this true? Are there really that many very rich people-those in the top
1%-who refuse to buy any investment property that pays any invest-
ment return (such as interest, dividends, rents and royalties) other than
appreciation in the value of the property, who never sell any property
with appreciation (thus realizing it for tax purposes), who refuse to earn
any labor income, to boot, and who borrow every dollar that they spend
on personal consumption? McCaffery implies to the reader that there are,
and that taxes are, indeed, completely voluntary for the very wealthy.
I am not arguing that everyone who is able to do so takes Tax Plan-
ning 101 to its limit, although I can assure you that after years of
advising, teaching, and lecturing I have learned that quite a few
wealthy people do. Rich Dad seems to have figured it out perfectly
well; there is no shortage of clever lawyers, accountants, and finan-
ciers giving advice and developing financial plans for the rich. But
even if many wealth holders don't take full advantage, the very pos-
sibility of Tax Planning 101, in all of its simplicity, ought to give us
pause. Any wealthy person-and America is spawning new million-
aires by the minute-can avoid paying taxes for the rest of her life. If
she does pay tax, it's in some sense a matter of her choice: she pays
tax because she wants to keep working, or because she invests in a
way that doesn't take Tax Planning 101 to the limit. Tax for the rich is
voluntary: they can live perfectly well without it.155
McCaffery glosses over the difficulty of legally avoiding tax. He implies
that it is a piece of cake. But as Weisbach warned in a different context:
This imperfection in substitution is the reason we collect so much tax
every year. Tax planning is very difficult. Although it is important to
154. Id. at 33-34.
155. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
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recognize the problems that highly liquid and sophisticated financial
markets pose for the tax system, we should not assume that hypo-
thetical equivalences mean that taxpayers can really eliminate tax by
using simple methods. 156
The real behavior changes that are required to avoid tax as McCaffery
suggests have real costs that make substitution undesirable for most peo-
ple. Indeed, evidence shows that the wealthy do not attempt to minimize
taxation of their capital income in any consistent way. Auerbach,
Berman, and Siegel found that "relatively few taxpayers realizing capital
156. David A. Weisbach, Thinking Outside the Little Boxes: A Response to Professor
Schlunk, 80 TEX. L. REV. 893, 908 (2002).
McCaffery gives the same misimpression to the middle class reader about the estate tax,
claiming that it, too, is easily avoided (and thus really voluntary) because of "Estate Plan-
ning 101," which entails giving "early" and "often." See MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at
68. But, again, this is terribly overstated because it belies the behavior of real people. The
very wealthy taxpayers who can afford to be (and who are) advised by the best Wall Street
lawyers often pay millions in estate tax if they if want to give as much as possible to non-
charitable beneficiaries other than a spouse. See generally Richard Schmalbeck, Avoiding
Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION 113 (2001)
(analyzing avoidance techniques); Richard Schmalbeck, Does the Death Tax Deserve the
Death Penalty? An Overview of the Major Arguments for Repeal of Federal Wealth-Transfer
Taxes, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 749, 757 (2000) (noting that analyses of "Internal Revenue
Service data on actual estate tax returns indicate that more than a third of [the $32.3 billion
in] revenue [for fiscal year 2001] will come from estates with gross values in excess of $10
million-estates that presumably had the benefit of expert estate planning, and could not
be said to have 'volunteered' in any meaningful sense to pay estate taxes").
With respect to the actual extent of giving "early" and "often" by the top 1%, James
Poterba found that "[a]lthough households that are potentially liable for estate taxes could
transfer roughly one-quarter of their net worth to their heirs through a systematic program
of planned giving, the observed flow of inter-vivos giving is substantially smaller than such
a tax avoidance program would imply." Poterba, supra note 126, at 330. "What is clear is
that nearly three-quarters of the elderly households for whom the estate tax may loom as a
potential burden are not making transfers." Id. at 345. "Many analysts hold the view that
the estate tax can be avoided by the use of sophisticated tax planning .... If the tax is
easily avoided, however, it is not clear why it does raise substantial revenue ...." Id. at
328-29.
I think that everyone sees the need for serious reform of the estate tax to reduce the
gamesplaying (and to limit it to the truly wealthy). Alternatively, we could replace it with a
system of realization at death (as Canada has done) or replace it with an income inclusion
by the donees, which I would like to see further explored, as it would eliminate the sepa-
rate tax by incorporating it into the income/consumption tax. See infra note 272. Some
form needs to be maintained, however, if we are serious about progressivity of the tax
burden and taxation of capital returns. Today, the estate tax serves as an important back-
stop to our hybrid income/consumption tax, indirectly taxing capital returns (mainly un-
realized gains) that were never taxed under the income/consumption tax. Providing a pure
consumption tax that allows the wealthy to grow their holdings without contributing to the
costs of government, and then to allow transfer of that wealth from generation to genera-
tion without tax, as it keeps growing over time, seems undefensible under my personal
ideology, described in Part I. As Slemrod and Bakija state:
A consumption tax.., that does not include bequests or inheritances in the
tax base will lower the average tax rate over a lifetime on those (generally
high-income) families who pass on wealth to their heirs .... For this reason
some economists who favor a consumption tax do so only if a bequest is
treated (that is, taxed) as if it were an act of consumption by the bequeathor.
SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 69, at 176-77. McCaffery does not support such treatment.
He wishes to allow wealth to accumulate without tax, and to be transferred from genera-
tion to generation without tax, until (and unless) it is spent on consumption, no matter how
many billions are accumulated.
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gains appear to utilize the avoidance strategies that theory would predict.
Put simply, over $100 billion capital gains are realized every year, and
most of them face a positive rate of tax."'1 57 Moreover, the authors recog-
nized that their initial data applied only to realized gains, which does not
take into account a reduction in effective tax rates by delayed realization.
So they went further.
To gain a more complete picture of the relationship between realized
and accrued gains, we look at the only available evidence on unreal-
ized gains, from the Survey of Consumer Finances .... If higher-
income people more successfully avoid realizing taxable gains, then
accrued gains should be more concentrated among high-income peo-
ple than realized gains. However, this pattern is not in evidence ....
For corporate stock, taxpayers with over $100,000 of income realized
about 87 percent of gains in the average year of the period, whereas
their accruals accounted for only 70 percent of gains. For business
assets, the respective values for realizations and accruals are 76 per-
cent and 61 percent. 158
They concluded: "Our findings dispel [the contention] that high-income
people can avoid the tax at will .... -159
In commenting on their work, Jane Gravelle notes that since capital
gains are the type of income "thought to be most under the straightfor-
ward control of the taxpayer," Auerbach, Burman, and Siegel's study "is
particularly significant because, if high-income taxpayers are not success-
fully practicing tax avoidance for this source of income, they are unlikely
to be more successful with other types of income.' 160 She found little to
criticize. "In fact, this study both suggests that the wealthy do not avoid
much capital gains tax and may present more evidence that the realiza-
tion response is not very powerful.' 6' She found particularly significant
the evidence that "higher-income individuals tend to have the same, or
larger, shares of realizations as they have of accruals."'162
[T]he real question is why high-income individuals realize so much
capital gain when there are many sophisticated techniques to avoid
tax while still obtaining cash and the risk characteristics desired ....
The authors present some evidence on the use of these sophisticated
techniques and find them not very widely used. One explanation may
be that transaction costs are too large to permit the shielding of gains
in this alternative way .... In any case, this failure to use tax-avoid-
ance techniques tends to provide additional evidence that the real-
izations response is not very large.
157. Alan J. Auerbach et al., Capital Gains Taxation and Tax Avoidance: New Evidence
from Panel Data, in ATLAS, supra note 1, at 355, 356.
158. Id. at 378.
159. Id. at 377.
160. Jane Gravelle, Commentary on Chapter 11, in ATLAS, supra note 1, at 389, 389.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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The apparently limited use of sophisticated techniques of capital
gains avoidance, even among very high-income individuals, is further
evidence of a limited sensitivity to tax factors. If individuals are not
willing to take the time to arrange tax-avoidance transactions to al-
low them to realize without paying tax, how much less willing would
they be to forgo sales altogether in order to minimize tax liability?
These observations give us some reasons to believe that the realiza-
tions response is not responsive to tax considerations. If realizations
elasticities are small, then much of the efficiency impetus for capital
gains reductions is eliminated, and the claims that the lower rates can
be adopted with little or no revenue loss cannot be true. Small real-
izations elasticities also suggest that the recent cuts in capital gains
taxes will be much more costly than predicted by the revenue estima-
tors at either the Joint Committee on Taxation or the Treasury, and
that the efficiency benefits are less significant than the distributional
consequences. 163
If there are not very many people like Artful Dodger out there, if em-
pirical studies show that the very rich simply don't behave like that, the
tax system is "voluntary" for the top 1% only in an unimportant, mean-
ingless sense. In another context, Francis Edgeworth said: "Only a very
clever man would discover that exceptional case; only a very foolish man
would take it as the basis of a rule for general practice. ' 164 To fundamen-
tally change the tax system to catch a theoretical taxpayer (or a handful
of real taxpayers) is overkill, to say the least.
The empirical evidence that we do have suggests that McCaffery is
wildly overstating the abundance of these wealthy tax dodgers (and then
using them to get the middle class taxpayer to go along with his preferred
tax system). As noted already, the top 1% pays more than a third of the
personal income taxes, suggesting that they are not willing to engage in
the significant behavior changes that would result in significant tax reduc-
tion. Very few taxpayers earning more than $200,000 per year (which is a
threshold well below the top 1%) pay no federal income tax, and there is
no trend indicating a significant problem. As reported by the Internal
Revenue Service:
For 1999, of the 2,429,942 income tax returns with AGI of $200,000
or more, 1,605 (0.066 percent) showed no U.S. income tax liability;
and 1,398 (0.056 percent) showed no worldwide income tax liability
.... For 1998, there were 1,467 returns (0.070 percent) with AGI of
$200,000 or more with no U.S. income tax liability; and 1,283 returns
(0.062 percent) with no worldwide income tax liability.
Of the 2,479,566 tax returns with expanded income of $200,000 or
more, 2,525 (0.102 percent) had no U.S. income tax liability; and
2,174 (0.088 percent) had no worldwide income tax liability .... Of
the 2,132,301 returns with expanded income of $200,000 or more for
163. Id. at 390-91.
164. Joel B. Slemrod, The Economics of Taxing the Rich, in ATLAS, supra note 1, at 3,
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1998, there were 2,224 (0.104 percent) with no U.S. income tax liabil-
ity; and 1,914 (0.090 percent) with no worldwide income tax liability.
Thus, the proportion of nontaxable returns both in terms of ex-
panded income or AGI and whether measured by absence of U.S.
income tax or absence of worldwide income tax decreased slightly
between 1998 and 1999.
The percentage of nontaxable returns are not substantially differ-
ent [between 1976 and 1999] regardless of whether measured in con-
stant or current dollars. 165
Of course, McCaffery might well respond that the people following his
Tax Planning 101 course would not show up in these statistics, since they
have changed their behavior so as to stop earning any realized income,
even from their investment portfolio, while living on borrowed money
secured by that portfolio. But, as noted above, other studies cast serious
doubt that the behavior of the top 1% conforms to the strictures required
by Tax Planning 101. Studies show that the very wealthy do not deliber-
ately avoid all realized income. Indeed, labor earnings comprise a large
(and growing) share of the top 1% picture.
Before the 1940s, the wealthiest Americans earned the bulk of their
income from returns on capital; now their primary source is wages
and salaries. In 1916, for example, the top 0.01 percent of "tax units"
earned 70 percent of their income from capital, 24 percent from busi-
ness ventures and only 6 percent from wages. By 1998, wages and
salaries accounted for 45 percent of the very top group's income;
business activities, 33 percent; and return on capital, 22 percent.' 66
Finally, the repeated implications that McCaffery makes to his middle
class reader that the very rich do not pay their fair share of taxes does not
even suggest to the reader that the very rich may actually pay much less
under his system than under our hybrid income/consumption tax. Be-
cause so much is at stake here-more than one-third of the total personal
income tax take-I would need reassuring empirical evidence that the top
1%'s share of the tax take would not be shifted downward, even to the
95th percentile group, under his plan, for such a shift can exacerbate even
further the increasing wealth concentration in the top 1% documented in
Part I. But he gives us no such assurance. He states: "The Fair Not Flat
Tax is roughly distributionally neutral: it doesn't significantly change the
broad pattern of who bears the tax burden."'1 67 I think that this statement
is very misleading to the middle class reader.
First, he doesn't define what he means by the "the broad pattern."
Does he mean only that the top quintile, the top 20%, will roughly pay
the same tax as it does today? If he's speaking only in quintiles, that can
165. Brian Balkovic, High-Income Tax Returns for 1998, in STAT. INCOME BULL. 7, 10
(2002).
166. Krueger, supra note 110.
167. MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 122.
[Vol. 56
2003] INCREMENTAL VS. FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 139
result in major shifting of the tax burden from the super wealthy to the
mass affluent who are not that different from the average. The top 1% is
truly different, as described in Part I-even from the next 4%. They are
not just wealthier but disproportionately wealthier, owning nearly 40% of
the private wealth in this nation.168 Any proposal that can significantly
reduce the tax burden on this very special group, and indeed which is
aimed specially at encouraging them to increase their wealth accumula-
tion even more through saving more, is troublesome (at least to me).
Second, he makes this claim by comparing for the reader the marginal
rate structures of his tax plan and the current Code (even though he had
previously instructed the reader on the importance of the average tax
rate). "[I]f we kept revenue constant and lowered rates on the rich, we'd
have to increase rates on the middle- and lower-income classes. '169 By
referring to a table comparing current marginal rates and the marginal
rates that he proposes for a family of four, he asserts that "the burden on
the lower and middle classes eases.' 170 At another point, he says that
making rich people pay tax on their spending "would in turn lower the
burden on ordinary workers," 171 again implying to the reader that his
plan would shift more of the tax burden from the middle class to the
wealthy. This, of course, is very misleading because the tax bases are dif-
ferent. Having a 50% marginal rate on spending at the top can extract
less tax than under current law. And having a 10% marginal rate on a tax
base at the bottom that includes borrowing to consume can result in a
higher tax bill than under current law. We need much more evidence than
he gives the reader regarding the mix of spending to realized income in
the top 1%, as well as the distribution of debt to finance consumption.
With respect to the former, McCaffery is constantly giving the impres-
sion to his reader that the rich class contains many profligate spenders
who must be reigned in for the good of the country. (More on his "for-
the-good-of-the-country" argument in the next subpart.) He talks about
"Rich Dads" as "people who are only about themselves, who look to
spend every last penny on their narrowly selfish desires. ' 172 This is one of
the ways in which he reinforces to the reader the implication that impos-
ing a tax on spending can increase the tax burden of the rich. But the
empirical evidence shows that the top 1% saves at extraordinary rates.
There is "strong evidence that the higher the lifetime income, the higher
the saving rate. 1 73 Slemrod noted:
The distribution of net saving by wealth class is also apparently quite
concentrated.... [Tihe top 1 percent of 1983 wealth-holders did 13
percent of net saving between 1983 and 1986; when ranked by 1986
168. See supra fig.4, Part I.A.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 93.
171. Id. at 51.
172. Id. at 75.
173. Stephen P. Zeldes, Commentary on Chapter 14, in ATLAS, supra note 1, at 485,
486.
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wealth-holders, the top 1 percent did 53.7 percent of net real saving!
The striking difference in results is due to the endogeneity of 1986
wealth to realized savings between 1983 and 1986-those who suc-
cessfully saved are, other things equal, bound to become
wealthier.17 4
The super rich save so much that one academic recently sought to ex-
plain precisely why they saved at rates so much higher than the middle
class. In Why Do the Rich Save So Much?,175 Christopher Carroll finds
that the typical "life cycle" model of saving, under which people save
primarily to finance their own future consumption, is persuasive for the
median income earner but not for the super wealthy, the top 1%. "[T]he
richest households [the top 1%] are saving more than can be justified
even in a version of the Life-Cycle model that allows for very patient
consumers with a strong precautionary saving motive. '1 7 6 So he next
models a "dynastic model," under which people save "mainly for the ben-
efit of their heirs,"'177 but finds this model lacking explanatory power as
well. He found that "only 5 percent of the total population, and 4 percent
of the wealthy households, indicated that providing an inheritance was
one of their top five reasons for saving."'1 78 There is also no evidence that
the wealthy childless elderly dissave. 179 Evoking Weber's argument that
the "pursuit of wealth for its own sake was the 'spirit of capitalism,"" 80
Carroll finally turns to what he calls a "capitalist spirit" model and con-
cludes that "the wealthy save because, either directly or indirectly, they
obtain greater pleasure from possessing an extra dollar of wealth than
they would get from an extra dollar of consumption .... "181 The "essen-
tial insight" of this model is that "consumers with permanent income be-
low a certain threshold behave like standard life-cycle consumers and try
to spend all their assets before death; consumers with permanent incomes
above the threshold save at ever increasing rates as lifetime income
rises." 1 82 He notes that informal evidence is also consistent with the no-
tion that "wealthy people derive utility either directly from the ownership
of wealth, or indirectly, either from the activities that lead to wealth ac-
cumulation or from a flow of services that is closely tied to the ownership
of that wealth." 183 "The view that all wealthy people are motivated solely
by a love of wealth for its own sake is surely extreme. A variety of other
plausible, and apparently very different, motivations are commonly pro-
posed, ranging from job satisfaction to status-seeking, to philanthropic
174. Slemrod, supra note 164, at 6.
175. Carroll, in ATLAS, supra note 1, at 465.
176. Id. at 469.
177. Id. at 465.
178. Id. at 472 (emphasis in original).
179. See id. at 473.
180. Id. at 474.
181. Id. at 466.
182. Id. at 475.
183. Id. at 476.
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ambitions, to power lust."1 84 But although these are very different psy-
chological motivations, some benign and some perhaps not, they lead to
behavior that is indistinguishable from the "wealth-in-the-utility-function
model." This means that, whatever the motivation of the super rich to
save, taxing the top 1% only on what they spend, and not taxing them on
what they save, can lead to a lower tax burden than what they endure
today. This can be the case even with quite progressive rates at the top. A
very high earner, who is subject to the 38.6% bracket today, can lower his
tax bill substantially under McCaffery's system by buying a huge house
and a stock portfolio with his earnings, behavior that apparently he is
already predisposed to engage in.
Moreover, since McCaffery effectively would not tax debt used to
purchase investment assets, I would predict that it is almost a certainty
that wealth disparities would accelerate, since money could be borrowed
on the strength of existing wealth to purchase more assets, and the return
on those assets would not be taxed, even the capital gains when sold, so
long as it was not consumed. Since only so much can be spent on con-
sumption, and since apparently the utility of further wealth accumulation
exceeds that of further consumption for the super wealthy, I suspect that
this would likely lead to even further wealth disparities and concentration
of wealth. At the least, I need to see better empirical evidence. McCaf-
fery explores none of this with his middle-class reader.
At bottom, McCaffery tries to convince his reader that his plan would
be significantly progressive by focusing only on his progressive tax rate
structure-devoting an entire chapter to it-while ignoring the effects of
his consumption tax base on the distribution of the tax burden. While at
first he tells the reader that he disagrees with the "flat tax" proponents
who seek to tax only labor income, not capital income, 185 because taxing
only labor income would be unfair, he finally concedes to his reader that
the flat tax base is essentially the same as his proposed base when he says:
"[T]he Fair Not Flat Tax agrees with conservatives [who support the flat
tax] about the tax base and with liberals, or at least moderates, about tax
rates. 1 86 The fact that one has a progressive marginal rate on spending
does not mean that you have a progressive tax as measured by realized
income. Especially in view of the evidence that savings rates increase
(and consumption rates decrease) as income rises, it could result in a flat
or even regressive tax when the tax paid on spending is placed in the
numerator and realized income placed in the denominator. We simply do
not have this evidence.
In a few places, McCaffery acknowledges to the reader that his pro-
posed tax could decrease-not increase, as he repeatedly implies else-
where-the tax burden on the super wealthy. At one point, he slips in
that "the rich will benefit most from the repeal of the gift and estate tax
184. Id. at 477.
185. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
186. MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 95.
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and the systematic nontaxation of savings under the Fair Not Flat Tax"' 87
in defending the use of progressive rates. He also says: "While certain
rich savers will win by repeal of the death tax, their good fortune will
inure to the benefit of all. When the wealthy save, they help society." 188
(Again, I'll address his implicit argument that decreasing the tax burden
on the wealthy will help the economy in the next subpart.)
Moreover, in the back of the book, in a question-and-answer section,
he poses two questions and answers on this count, which are worth quot-
ing in full. This is what he says in response to the question: "If we don't
tax savings at all, won't private capital build up and up, making the distri-
bution of wealth more uneven than it is today?"
Not necessarily, and probably not. Remember that the inconsistent
income tax already fails to tax most savings. The estate tax is easily
avoided by those so motivated. Worse, the rich today can consume
free. Under a consistent spending tax, this will no longer be possible.
A billionaire spending $10 million a year will now have to pay taxes
on $10 million a year. The consistent progressive tax on spending will
reduce the accumulated wealth of those rich people living the good
life.
Here's another, more technical way to make the point. People often
assume that tax rates will have to go up under a consumption tax,
because the tax base will shrink when we systematically exclude sav-
ings. That would be true if we were starting from a consistent income
tax. But of course we are not. The inconsistent income tax already
misses most savings. And a consistent consumption tax would have
two major base-broadening features compared to the status quo: the
inclusion of debt-financed consumption in the tax base, and the re-
peal of a special preference for capital gains. These changes would
diminish, not enhance, the privileges of the rich.189
Notice that when he says that "the inconsistent income tax already fails
to tax most savings," as though his plan wouldn't change much, he does
not qualify that statement by income distribution. It is absolutely true
that the savings of the lower and middle classes are protected from taxa-
tion through pension plans, IRAs, life insurance, and home sale gain that
goes untaxed on sale, even if the proceeds are not rolled over into an-
other house but rather spent on consumption in retirement. (Indeed, they
get better-than-consumption tax treatment, since their savings are un-
taxed while their borrowings are also excluded from the tax base, unlike
under a pure consumption tax.) But he neglects to mention that the earn-
ings of the top 1%, which I am most interested in and which pays more
than a third of the tax, exceed the income limits for some of the most
important consumption tax features aimed at the lower and middle clas-
ses. The chief consumption tax feature for the top 1% is the realization
requirement, which shelters unrealized appreciation in property from tax.
187. Id. at 124.
188. Id. at 110.
189. Id. at 151.
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But we have seen that the wealthy consistently realize these gains,190 con-
trary to McCaffery's Tax Planning 101 instructions. Moreover, his as-
sumption that inclusion of debt-financed consumption in the tax base
would hurt the super rich more than the middle class is not backed up by
any empirical evidence. As noted earlier, the super rich save at extraordi-
nary rates, and the middle class has seen the greatest rise in debt.
McCaffrey asks, "But how can you just ignore the pleasure and power
that large amounts of savings would bring?" 191 This is what he says in
response:
This comment gets back to a basic liberal misconception: that fair-
ness dictates taxing savings. I believe that the liberals are wrong.
For one thing, capital helps us all-perhaps especially the lower
and middle classes. Rich people who save are contributing to soci-
ety's overall well-being. They are not being selfish, spending every
last penny on themselves in order to go broke. It's backward to have
a tax policy that punishes rich people for saving and encourages
them to spend-encourages them, that is, to pursue a lavish and lux-
urious lifestyle. High-end consumption, not the accumulation of cap-
ital, should be the liberal's true concern.
Let's take the liberal objection more seriously for a moment. It is
true that large sums might build up in private Trust Accounts under a
consistent consumption tax. But what is wrong with the mere posses-
sion of large amounts of wealth?
Two answers spring to mind. One, people who have wealth will
one day be able to spend a lot of money on themselves and live luxu-
riously. The possession of wealth confers the right to future con-
sumption. But a consistent progressive spending tax such as the Fair
Not Flat Tax checks this problem. When holders of large Trust Ac-
counts go to spend down their wealth, they will be taxed. If they
make large withdrawals to spend lavishly on nonurgent needs, they
will be taxed at the highest marginal rate level. The Fair Not Flat Tax
gets at both actual consumption and future consumption. In fact, it
does so far better than the inconsistent income tax system, notwith-
standing the latter's seeming concern with capital as a source of po-
tential consumption. Recall that when Ross Perot spent $60 million
running for President, he saved $33 million in today's taxes [not be-
cause his expenses were deductible under the income tax-they were
not-but on McCaffery's theory that spending the money before he
died removed the money from his estate and thus avoided tax under
the estate tax]. Under the proposed consistent consumption tax he
would have to withdraw $120 million from his Trust Account and pay
$60 million in taxes in order to spend $60 million on himself. Which
system does a better job at getting at the pleasures that wealth
bestows?
The second concern about private possession of wealth is that peo-
ple who have a lot of capital will become too powerful. Large pools
190. See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
191. MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 151.
SMU LAW REVIEW
of private savings may indeed confer a level of power on their hold-
ers that would be troubling in a liberal democracy. If Bill Gates or
Warren Buffet could use their billions of dollars to affect politics, this
would be problematic. Of course, they can do that easily enough
under today's inconsistent income-plus-estate tax. Wealthy, sophisti-
cated investors like Gates and Buffet need not pay any tax on their
capital if they follow Arftul Dodger's simple plan, even if they are
using the money to influence economic markets or politics.
Liberals might point out that the Fair Not Flat Tax will allow even
greater stores of wealth to accumulate within the Trust Accounts and
hence will be more problematic than the status quo. I've already in-
dicated my skepticism about this claim. But more important, a con-
sistent spending tax automatically generates a mechanism to monitor
and control the problem of the private abuse of wealth in a way that
the current tax system does not. We can regulate the Trust Accounts
to prevent their abuse just as we regulate most large pools of capital
today. 192
Where to start? As noted earlier, I'll address his "the-rich-help-us-all-
by-saving" argument in the next subsection, which deals more fully with
his economic arguments. He also asks rhetorically what is wrong with the
mere possession of large amounts of wealth and responds, first, that it
confers the right to future consumption. Since a spending tax would tax
that consumption, he avers that he's got that base covered. But, of course,
that does not respond to the question of why the person who was able to
exploit our regulated capitalist system to reap huge rewards should not
have to pay any of the costs of that system until such time (if ever) that he
spends money. Tax deferral is tax reduction in present value terms-and
can be the equivalent of complete forgiveness. Moreover, it's not the
spending of the money that justifies his payment of part of the costs of
capitalism; it's the earning of the money via that system, whether by labor
or capital, that justifies his having to pay part of the costs-even if he
doesn't spend a dime of it. But this diverts me to his "morality" argu-
ment, which is the subject of the third subpart, below.
Let me at least say with respect to his Ross Perot example that I find it
truly remarkable that he is essentially arguing that Ross Perot ran for
president in order to save on his estate taxes! The rich "might as well
spend their money running for high-ranking elected offices-as Perot did
in 1992. He used $60 million of his money to run for president, thereby
saving over $30 million in eventual estate taxes.' 1 93 (I don't know if he
really believes this simplistic view of incentives or if he merely wants his
middle-class reader, whom he's trying to convince with this book, to be-
lieve it.) I also find it difficult to swallow the argument that we should
repeal the estate tax in order to provide a disincentive for wealthy people
to run for political office. It's tantamount to saying that we can prevent
rich people from running for office if only we would reduce their tax bur-
192. Id. at 151-53.
193. Id. at 71.
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den and thus make them even wealthier (which is what I believe a con-
sumption tax without estate tax, in replacement for our current Internal
Revenue Code, would do-even with a top spending marginal tax rate of
50%). It's a truly silly argument, in my view.
The second objection that he foresees, and addresses, is that the in-
creased wealth accumulation that can occur in the top 1% under his plan
can lead to excessive power. His answer? Regulate the savings of these
wealthy people so that they don't abuse their power. He seems to be con-
cerned only with excessive economic power (the power to control an in-
dustry, say, through concentrating investment in that one industry),
because his answer is to require diversification. 194 He also would make
sure that lobbying expenses are treated as personal consumption ex-
penses (as they are under current law) so that they are taxed. Suffice it to
say that I don't think that requiring diversification and ensuring that lob-
bying expenditures are taxed, as they already are today, begins to answer
the myriad political, social, and economic problems that can arise with
excessive wealth concentration. For example, extreme wealth concentra-
tion in a nation seems to correlate with average lower life expectancy 95
and slower economic growth.' 96
Before moving on to his economic arguments, let me close with a fur-
ther word on his repeated assertions, both implied and explicit, that the
rich don't pay tax in this country, or can easily and legally avoid tax under
current law, and that this is one of the big reasons to come on board in
support of his plan. One has to read his entire book to get the full flavor
of how he belabors this point as a way to sell his tax plan to the reader,
whom he clearly envisions to be the average taxpayer. In my view, this
does a great disservice. The average taxpayer, when polled, already thinks
that the rich easily avoid taxes on a massive scale. One survey, for exam-
ple, revealed that people on average believed that 45% of millionaires
paid no income tax! 197 1 understand his motivation. I understand that Mc-
Caffery wishes the reader to become so incensed at the rich not paying
tax that he will sign on to his plan as a way to get the rich guy. But further
nurturing these misconceptions on the part of the public in an attempt to
sell his tax is simply not defensible, in my view-particularly when his
plan might well end up taxing the all-important top 1% less heavily than
under current law.
B. ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS
Most supporters of consumption taxation do so on economic grounds.
They claim that if savings were freed from tax, and only personal con-
sumption were taxed, then people would actually react to this incentive,
changing their behavior by substituting savings behavior for consumption
194. See id. at 147-48.
195. See generally Krugman, supra note 70, at 67.
196. See infra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
197. See Slemrod, supra note 164, at 8.
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behavior-a phenomenon dubbed the "substitution effect." The addi-
tional money injected into the economy from greater investment (from
their new savings) by U.S. citizens and residents would increase economic
growth. It might even reduce interest rates-at least if the government is
not dissaving at the same time by deficit spending and foreign investors
are not withdrawing their U.S. investments.
Another way that they like to say the same thing is that savings are
subject to double taxation under an income tax, whereas consumption is
subject to only a single tax. The argument is that when $100 of wages are
earned, and taxed, the taxation of that $100 is also-at the same time-
implicit taxation of any future investment income which that $100 will
earn (if invested), since that $100 represents the present value of any fu-
ture investment return under common valuation models. If we tax the
actual investment return when earned, we're taxing a portion of that ini-
tial $100 a second time, or so the argument goes.198 In contrast, if the
taxpayer spends that $100 on personal consumption, instead of investing
it, it is taxed only once (when spent, since the amount spent is not de-
ducted and thus is taxed by failing to be removed from the tax base). To
complete the argument, they assert that people actually appreciate this
and actually react to this disincentive by consuming instead of saving in
order to avoid this supposed double taxation.
McCaffery repeatedly relies on such economic arguments-and then
unexpectedly says "never mind." For example, he tells his reader: "Be-
cause of the second tax on savings, all else being equal, people will save
less under an income tax than they will under a consumption tax." 199 The
"all else being equal" must encapsulate an awful lot that he does not tell
his reader, for it ignores the fact that many people are so-called target
savers, who save for fixed targets, such as $500,000 in the bank by age 65,
or $100,000 in the bank by the time that Junior reaches college age. Be-
cause of the tax preference for savings under a consumption tax, a target
saver can actually reduce his savings rate (the percentage of his earnings
that he saves) and still reach his target-a phenomenon dubbed the "in-
198. Personally, I've always found this "double tax" argument to be rather dubious. It's
not double taxation in "real time." The investment return is new wealth to the taxpayer
when it's actually earned. Simply because one method of pricing an investment under fi-
nancial theory is to compute the present value of future, expected returns does not mean
that taxing the initial amount invested is tantamount to taxing all those future returns as
well. And I think that Nicholas Kaldor, whose work McCaffery cites (see MCCAFFERY,
supra note 114, at 58), agreed with me. He said:
Some people would take strong objection to this statement on the ground
that the market value of property is merely the discounted value of its ex-
pected future yield; wealth viewed as a stock and as a flow are merely two
different aspects of the same thing, and not two different things; to regard the
discounted value of the flow of wealth as something additional to the flow of
wealth itself is counting the same thing twice over. All this may well be true
from some points of view, but from the point of view of the measurement of
taxable capacity-which is the only purpose in question here-it is not correct
to say that the one is just a reflection of the other.
NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX 31-32 (3d ed. 1955) (emphasis added).
199. MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 36.
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come effect." The extent to which the substitution effect (which would
increase the savings rate) and the income effect (which would reduce it)
operates in the economy is unknown,200 but there is reason to believe
that there are a lot of target savers in the middle class. As noted earlier,
the evidence seems to indicate that they more often tend to be life-cycle
savers, trying to save enough to meet future consumption needs in retire-
ment but spending the rest of their money, while the super rich seem to
get more utility out of an extra dollar of savings at the margin than an
extra dollar of consumption, contributing to the high savings rate of the
wealthy.20' Moreover, the decrease in the savings rate of the middle class
over the last twenty years or so has corresponded to the broadening of
consumption tax treatment for retirement savings for the middle class,
which may be indirect evidence that they are target savers. Even focusing
merely on the substitution and income effects is too simplistic, since many
people save for reasons that have nothing to do with tax incentives or
disincentives at all. Behavioral economists admit to not knowing at all
why people save. The decisions can be an amalgam of inability to delay
gratification, hyperbolic discount rates (which is another way of saying
the same thing, because it means that a person would require unreasona-
bly high rates of return to make it worthwhile to save and thus delay
immediate gratification), general personality traits, even the role of
shame.202 Since middle class savers already enjoy better-than-consump-
tion tax treatment for the bulk of their savings, enacting a pure consump-
tion tax might do little more than provide inefficient windfall benefits to
the top 1% for the savings behavior that they would have engaged in
anyway.
While McCaffery tells his reader nothing of these difficult empirical
questions, he does admit that some people might actually save less under
a pure consumption tax but also states that "it is ... not necessary to be
precise. Most economists agree that a consumption tax is more efficient
than an income tax. If we could turn back time and start over again with a
consistent consumption tax, we would be a wealthier, happier people to-
day. °203 The thoughtful lay reader who would like to make up his own
mind on the evidence is told, essentially, to take his word for it that there
would be nontrivial efficiency gains and that "most economists" agree on
this (and also, by implication, to exalt efficiency over all).
He also dumbs down for his reader the connection between a consump-
tion tax and interest rates. "[H]aving money available for investment is a
good thing for the economy: the more capital there is, the lower interest
200. "Economic theory is completely silent on the question of which of these two op-
posing effects will dominate. The case for the conventional (supply side) position must
therefore be made on empirical grounds." Robert H. Frank, Progressive Taxation and the
Incentive Problem, in ATLAS, supra note 1, at 490, 491.
201. See supra notes 173-84 and accompanying text.
202. See Mary Kane, Behavioral Economists Can't Say Why We Spend, CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER, May 21, 2001, at 4C; Jacob M. Schlesinger, Few Americans Heed Washington's
Urging for Bigger Nest Eggs, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1999, at Al (providing anecdotes).
203. MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 37.
SMU LAW REVIEW
rates become. Lower interest rates help us all . . ",204 And again:
"[S]avings are very important. The national pool of savings helps to keep
interest rates low. This in turn helps today's homeowners, students, and
middle-class consumers, as well as future generations-our children and
our children's children. ' 20 5 Who wouldn't like lower interest rates? It's
another reason to sign on to his plan, he implies to his reader.
While that's true as far as it goes, it doesn't go very far, and again he
doesn't give any hint to his reader of the complexities inherent in such
broad, sweeping, but ultimately simplistic-to-a-fault statements. Once
again, I get the feeling that McCaffery is more interested in simply getting
the reader on board for his plan than in truly educating him, and so he
doesn't want to introduce any complications that might undermine his
case. The statement implicitly assumes so much. It assumes that private
capital must come from savers in this country (rather than from savers
abroad investing in this country, as occurred heavily in the 1990s), so we
must increase the flow of private capital from savers in this country; it
assumes that replacing our current Code would substantially increase the
private savings rate; and it assumes that the government would not, at the
same time, engage in deficit spending, which is dissaving that could offset
the increase in private saving.20 6 None of this is assured, and thus interest
rates could very well remain unchanged (or even rise) while the tax bur-
den of the top 1% could well be shifted downward.
For example, Slemrod and Bakija, in their book also written for the
general public, helpfully describe, in easy-to-understand terms, the diffi-
culties of measuring whether or not a consumption tax replacement for
the current Code would actually increase private savings significantly
(which could lower U.S. interest rates if the savings stay in this country,
there is not an exodus of foreign investment, and the government doesn't
significantly deficit spend). They conclude that any effect would likely be
quite modest-whether the tax under examination is a flat-rate consump-
tion tax (such as the so-called flat tax) or a progressive cash-flow con-
sumption tax similar to McCaffery's proposal (the USA tax). They also
introduce the important notion that economic growth might also be had
at the sacrifice of quality of life if it means more hours worked. In other
words, efficiency is not, in fact, all.
The potential economic benefits of switching to a consumption tax
are real, but how large would these benefits be? ... In many cases,
the best evidence suggests only a moderate effect .... It is clear that
promises of miraculously higher growth rates forever are unjustified
by the existing evidence.
204. Id. at 38.
205. Id. at 120.
206. Cf. William G. Gale & Samara R. Potter, An Economic Evaluation of the Eco-
nomic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 133 (2002) (con-
cluding that the deficit spending produced by the tax cuts for the wealthy in the 2001 act
will increase long-term interest rates and thus dampen the projections for economic growth
that were otherwise assumed to accompany the tax cuts for the wealthy).
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Based on historical experience, many important areas of economic
behavior, especially savings rates and hours worked, appear to be
unresponsive to moderate changes in incentives.
According to [Alan Auerbach's] estimates, adopting the USA Tax,
which has the most progressive rate structure and significant transi-
tion relief, would generate little growth in output per capita, leaving
it only 1.6 percent higher than it otherwise would be after ten years
.... Achieving these gains in the simulations requires a doubling of
the saving rate. Although the model is based on a reasonable esti-
mate of the likely saving response, the large simulated increase in
saving rates suggests that a slightly different model may be more ap-
propriate. Auerbach also concludes that introducing into the model
either a reasonable cost of adjusting the capital stock or a lower re-
sponsiveness of work effort would reduce the projected growth
significantly.
Other modeling changes can alter the answers a lot. For example,
Eric Engen of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors staff and
William Gale have constructed a model of the economy that ac-
counts for the fact that the income tax system already lets much capi-
tal income go untaxed and also incorporates a precautionary motive
for saving. Their model suggests that switching to a consumption tax
would increase the saving rate by only around one-tenth of its cur-
rent level, leading to a correspondingly small impact on economic
well-being.
[Increases in "welfare" are far more modest under consumption
tax proposals.] For example,. . . some of the increased output occurs
because people are projected to work a greater number of hours.
Working longer hours obviously has a cost in terms of lost leisure, so
the increased output is an overestimate of the net benefit. "Welfare"
is the economists' term for a dollar measure of well-being that takes
these factors into account. In these stylized models, increases in wel-
fare from tax reform are considerably smaller than increases in out-
put. For example, in Auerbach's model, welfare is estimated to
increase by between 0.64 percent and 1.85 percent for future genera-
tions, depending on which consumption tax is adopted .... Other
studies have come to similar conclusions.
What can be concluded from all this? It is possible that the shift to
a flat-rate, clean-base consumption tax system could eventually cause
incomes to increase by a few percentage points, with some of that
gain offset by less leisure time or reduced spending in the early years.
Much of the potential gain from the reform plans comes from scaling
back progressivity or shifting burdens onto older generations. It is
not clear how the economic gains would be distributed among the
population, but they would probably go disproportionately to the
same people who benefit most from the tax changes even without
any economic response. There is an unavoidable trade-off here, as
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younger generations and higher-income people would be made bet-
ter off at the expense of older generations and poorer people; it is
extremely unlikely that economic growth would allow us to tran-
scend these trade-offs entirely. Plenty of uncertainty applies to all of
the predictions.20 7
Their own bottom-line, personal conclusion?
The weight of the evidence suggests private saving is probably not
very responsive to the after-tax rate of return. The bottom line is that
switching to a consumption tax does not guarantee a big boost in
saving and investment-our best guess is that at most there would be
only a small increase. Because there are more direct ways to increase
national saving (for example, increasing the budget surplus), the
likely but not assured prospect of a somewhat higher saving rate
does not appear to be, by itself, a reason to undertake a wholesale
transformation of the tax system.208
McCaffery provides his reader no such nuance. As a true believer, he
seems interested only in preaching to his readers the salvation of his plan.
And again he seems to imply that the rich don't save now, which is why
we need to provide tax incentives for them to save so that the economy
can grow, which would help the middle class.
[F]or most Americans there is no real difference between an in-
come tax and a consumption tax, because most Americans don't
save.
For the most part, then, the difference between an income and a
consumption tax base directly impacts only the wealthy. But this
does not mean that the choice of tax is unimportant. Far from it.
Savings matter. The attempt to tax savings has had major conse-
quences for tax policy in America. What the rich do with their money
is important for the rest of us mainly because it is important to our
national economy. Saving is good for us all. We ought to be encourag-
ing the rich to save; it is exactly the same thing as not encouraging
them to consume so much on themselves. We also ought to be making
it easier for ordinary working-class people to get into the savings
habit. Any true income tax is backward in this regard.20 9
He neglects to say that working-class people can already shelter virtu-
ally all of their savings from tax. We don't have a "true income tax" for
the middle class. (Indeed, he implies the opposite when he says that his
tax "is fairer-especially to those middle-class Americans who are trying
to save" 210-implying that the savings of the middle class are taxed now
and would not be only under his tax.) The issue is whether we ought to
extend the consumption tax treatment already enjoyed by the working
class to the top 1%. McCaffery says yes, because we need to get them to
save in order to expand the economy. But, as noted earlier, the rich al-
207. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 69, at 232-35.
208. Id. at 180.
209. MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 41 (emphasis added).
210. Id. at 121.
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ready have high savings rates, so once again, a consumption tax might do
little more than provide inefficient windfall benefits to those who would
have saved anyway.
More important, the logical corollary of his argument that the rich will
save more than they do now if we enact a pure consumption tax is that
wealth accumulation by the top 1% will grow even more concentrated.
Robert Frank points out that economic inequality has historically been
accompanied by slower, not more rapid, growth rates. 211 In other words,
if McCaffery is right that the wealthy would, in fact, react to the savings
incentives of a pure consumption-without-estate tax to increase their sav-
ings rates even more, then the increasing wealth inequality documented
in Part I could become even more pronounced. (This would seem to be
particularly true if, as I will discuss below, he is right that the middle class
can increase their consumption levels under a consumption tax, which
would logically seem to decrease their savings rates even further.) Those
"supply siders" who argue for lower taxation of capital, as under a con-
sumption tax, in order to support economic growth ignore several cross-
national studies described by Frank that seem to show strong negative
correlations between inequality and growth rates. The "golden age" of
economic growth rates of 5% per year in the U.S. and most of the rest of
the industrialized world occurred between the end of WWII and roughly
1973, a time of high marginal tax rates on the wealthy and much less
income and wealth inequality than the period since 1973, which has wit-
nessed growing wealth and income inequality, accompanied by an in-
crease in the aggregate federal tax burden on those earning less than the
median income of $50,000 and a decrease in the aggregate tax burden on
the wealthy. Moreover, those countries with greater shares of national
income going to the poor and middle classes had higher growth rates. He
concludes that "higher growth rates are associated not with higher in-
come inequality, as predicted by supply-siders, but with lower inequal-
ity.' ' 212 While he notes that correlation is not cause and effect, and other
factors may be at work, he also notes that so far they haven't been identi-
fied. "There was never any solid theoretical support for the existence of
this trade-off [between equity and efficiency], and the empirical evidence,
such as it is, would never change a skeptic's mind." 213 It hasn't changed
this skeptic's mind.214
211. Frank, supra note 200, at 495.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Even though Frank supports progressive taxation to decrease inequality on both
efficiency and fairness grounds, he supports consumption taxation over income taxation as
well because he believes it would dampen consumer demand and the keep-up-with-the-
Joneses mentality (what he calls "luxury fever"). See id. at 503. Because McCaffery's con-
sumption-tax-without-estate-tax plan might well increase wealth concentration and ine-
quality, however, it seems to me that complete reliance on such a plan would be
inconsistent with Frank's concern for such inequality. Perhaps an add-on consumption tax
for the wealthy would address his concerns. As an interesting side note, the first time that
Congress considered enacting a cash-flow consumption tax was as an add-on tax to dis-
courage consumer demand. In 1942, the Roosevelt administration wanted to raise Social
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Another argument that McCaffery makes that seems to be premised-
at least implicitly-on economic grounds is that if we can get the rich to
save more by consuming less there will be more for the lower classes to
consume.
[M]oving to a consistent consumption tax does not mean that the law
will oppose consumption, which many people consider to be the "en-
gine of the economy." Indeed, the Fair Not Flat Tax is more pro-
consumption-and more genuinely progressive [editorial comment:
he provides no empirical evidence for that]-than the mess we're in
.... In fact, a good reason to implement the Fair Not Flat Tax is that
it will achieve more equality, more fairness in consumption-it will
make it a little bit easier for the lower and middle classes to consume,
in part by making it harder for the rich to consume and getting them to
save more instead.2 15
He says essentially the same thing later.
A consistent, progressive spending tax ought to make it easier for the
lower and middle classes to consume by putting more of the respon-
sibility for the nation's savings on the shoulders of the rich. And the
whole society should want the rich to save. This moves us toward a
model of class teamwork and away from class conflict.216
And again later:
The question of providing for the nation's total supply of savings thus
becomes one of asking who should consume less in order to fund
society's reasonable capital stock requirements. The flip side to the
question of what consumption should we tax is what nonconsump-
tion should we encourage? The Fair Not Flat Tax's answer is compel-
ling: it is the wealthy who should consume less. "This would free up
the lower and middle classes to consume more."21 7
Huh? How does it make it easier for the middle class to consume more
if the rich consumes less? That somehow implies that there is only a lim-
ited amount of "stuff" to consume out there, and the rich are taking "too
much" of it, leaving only the leftover detritus for the middle class. If he's
talking only about nonrenewable resources, such as fossil fuels, perhaps
he has a point. But he certainly doesn't tell his reader that he's talking
about that. I would think the average reader would take away the impres-
sion that he's talking about all manner of daily consumable items. But
that ignores the laws of supply and demand. If the demand is there for the
stuff, it generally will be produced (again, unless we're talking about land
Security taxes in part to combat inflation by dampening consumer demand. The House
rejected that idea but essentially got to the same place through the back door by proposing
to piggyback a cash-flow consumption tax onto the income tax (since, as discussed earlier,
a wage tax such as the Social Security tax can be seen as a consumption tax). The tax would
have been imposed on income less savings, loan repayments, and some other preference
items. It got killed quickly. See WUI'E, supra note 3, at 117.
215. MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 43 (emphasis added).
216. Id. at 90.
217. Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
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or some such limited commodity). Perhaps he means that if the rich stop
buying, the price of stuff will go down under the laws of supply and de-
mand, enabling the middle class to afford some items that they find too
pricey now. But, again, he certainly doesn't say this. Or perhaps-as I
think likely-he means that if the wealthy save more the economy will
grow, which will allow the middle class to be paid higher wages, allowing
the middle class to consume more. The more traditional way of phrasing
what Slemrod and Bakija call this "highly controversial" argument is that
taxing capital depresses wages.218 But if that's what he means, it belies his
assertion that, in fact, he's not relying on any sort of supply-side or
"trickle-down-economics" argument, which he refers to as "voodoo
economics."
[T]he argument against an income tax and for a consumption tax like
the Fair Not Flat Tax does not depend on any precise measurement
of actual [economic] effects. It is not an argument like the supply-
side supporters of Ronald Reagan and other conservative Republi-
cans might make. I am not saying, let alone promising, that there will
be X percent more work or Y percent more savings, or that GDP
will increase by Z percent under a consumption tax. Washington,
D.C., today is overrun with economists working in plush think tanks,
cranking out "dynamic analysis" to show how much richer we would
all be if we could just cut taxes their way. Most of this stuff is nothing
more than "voodoo economics," as the elder George Bush called it
two decades ago. I am not relying on witchcraft. The argument for
the Fair Not Flat Tax is about simplicity, efficiency, consistency
and-first and foremost-about fairness. It rests on an appeal to our
enlightened common sense. It is not about the total size of the na-
tion's capital stock. 219
I have to admit that now I'm really lost. What are all the arguments
that he made that I quoted above about how getting the rich to save more
would help us all by injecting more capital into the economy, which
would lower interest rates, etc., if not economic arguments? He explicitly
argued: "What the rich do with their money is important for the rest of us
mainly because it is important to our national economy. Saving is good for
us all."'220 He also said: "The question of providing for the nation's total
supply of savings thus becomes one of asking who should consume less in
218. They explain:
[The] argument goes as follows. Taxes on capital income ... reduce the rate
of return to saving, which in turn reduces how much people save. Because
saving is what finances capital investment, a decline in saving over time
means that there is a less capital-intensive and therefore less productive
economy. By this reasoning, workers ultimately bear some of the burden of
taxes on capital income, because their wages are reduced when the economy
is less productive.
SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 69, at 69-70. The authors go on to describe why the argu-
ment is "highly controversial." See id. at 70.
219. MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 42. He repeats himself later: "This is not a supply-
side argument that depends on predictions that there will be more money for us all, that we
will have a higher GDP, or anything like that." Id. at 128.
220. Id. at 41 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
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order to fund society's reasonable capital stock requirements.' 22 1 But now
he says that he does not rely on economic arguments or capital stock
needs at all, that such stuff is "voodoo economics." It's all about "effi-
ciency" (which, by the way, is an economic argument) and "fairness. '1222
So why does he talk about how the nation will benefit, including the
lower classes, if the rich save even more than they do now under their
high savings rates? If it's only about "fairness," not economics, how can it
be more "fair" to the middle and lower classes if the rich save more? I'm
confused. Those arguments about getting the rich to save more have to be
economic ones. I have to believe that McCaffery is hoping that his lay
reader will, in fact, believe all the economic assertions and will discount
the disclaimer. At the same time, he can then tell detractors (who might
point out that others say that the economic effects would likely be weak)
that he is not relying on any economic arguments but only on notions of
"fairness." So it is to those fairness arguments that I now turn.
C. THE FAIRNESS OR MORALITY OF CONSUMPTION TAXATION
McCaffery says: "I believe that fairness is the most important element
of a good tax system .... ",223 He also says that he believes in the ability-
to-pay norm as a norm of tax justice, but he believes that someone must
demonstrate her ability to pay by an act of spending. Merely having ability
to pay is not sufficient to require that person to contribute towards the
cost of capitalism.
Let me be perfectly clear: I agree with "ability to pay" as a general
principle informing the fairness of any tax. But the fatal flaw of even
a consistent income tax is that it determines one's ability to pay at
the wrong time-at the time of earning from labor or capital, rather
than at the time of spending. The Fair Not Flat Tax will get at the
rich-but when, and only when, they show their ability to pay by
choosing to spend money on themselves.22 4
He does not say why it is unfair to tax the rich when they "have" ability
to pay, rather then when they "show" that they have such ability, other
than to say that taxing someone at the point of wealth accumulation does
nothing more than attempt to tax "the sheer joy and psychological plea-
221. Id. at 94.
222. He also says that it's about simplicity, but Slemrod and Bakija, at least, disagree
that a cash-flow consumption tax would be simple.
Unlike the other kinds of consumption tax discussed so far, the personal con-
sumption tax would complicate tax matters for many individuals .... The tax
affairs of the average taxpayer, . . . for whom the conceptual measurement
difficulties of capital income are not of little concern, would be complicated
by the addition to the tax base of borrowing and savings account withdraw-
als. Even credit card borrowing could have tax consequences.
SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 69, at 221. They go on to note that it would likely be a
difficult tax to enforce and would be far more intrusive into our financial affairs on a
continuing basis.
223. MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 40.
224. Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
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sure of owning capital" and that "[n]o tax tries to get at purely psycholog-
ical pleasure. '225
As made clear in Part I, I argue that amassing wealth itself demon-
strates ability to pay, whether or not that amassed wealth is "shown" by
an act of consumption. I also argue that it is fair to tax that wealth ac-
cumulation at the time of accumulation, because those savings were made
possible by our regulated capitalist system and thus should shoulder part
of the costs of that system. Delayed taxation is reduced taxation because
of the time value of money. And, I would add, we are not taxing the
"psychological pleasure of owning capital" but rather real dollars. Why is
it "fair" to allow one who chooses to live like a miser and amass great
wealth to escape contributing toward the cost of the regulated capitalist
system that made his wealth possible in the first place?
Moreover, he does not address the shift in the tax burden downward
from the top 1% that I suspect would attend his consumption-without-
estate tax-no matter how high the top marginal rate on big spenders-
or how the increased wealth disparity that would likely accompany it
would be conducive to a happy, healthy America. He acknowledges that
anyone who allows the wealth they earn to accumulate is not charged any
of the costs of the capitalist system in which their wealth accumulation
was made possible; they are "untouched by current taxation. '226 But
rather than seeing this as unfair, he argues that this person isn't "getting
away with something .... She is simply living a noble, prudent lifestyle
and helping everyone else out in the process .... "227 His is a very benign
view, full of stereotypes, where anyone who allows wealth to accumulate
is "noble," not power-hungry, and anyone who spends is "selfish"-"peo-
pie who are only about themselves, who look to spend every last penny
on their narrowly selfish desires. '228
The way I read McCaffery is that he believes a spending tax is more
fair on essentially two grounds. The first is that it taxes very rich people
who have no earnings and who are living off of borrowed money. The
second is that saving is inherently moral behavior. Both are discussed
below.
If McCaffery believes that a spending tax would satisfy the ability-to-
pay norm that he says he favors, he must believe that there are an awful
lot of people out there who are very wealthy with non-income-producing
assets (i.e., which pay no dividends, interest, rents, or royalties), who
don't work, who don't realize any of the built-in gain in those otherwise
non-income-producing assets by selling them, and who are financing their
personal consumption entirely with debt secured by these assets. If there
really is such a large group of people, the only way to satisfy the ability-
to-pay norm for this group would be to tax them when they spend, since
225. Id. at 153.
226. Id. at 105.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 75.
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they have very little realized income. He says that a spending tax "would
get rich people who finance a high-end lifestyle with capital to bear some
tax, as they should but now don't. '22 9
Such an approach would be consistent with the thinking of Nicholas
Kaldor, a British economist, favorably cited by McCaffery, 230 who was
best known for systematically exploring the concept of a spending tax
premised on ability-to-pay grounds. Kaldor was not interested in the
"double-tax-on-savings" argument for consumption taxation, as he didn't
think it was double taxation. 231 Rather, he wrote:
[The] case [for an expenditure tax] does not really rest on the ele-
ment of "double taxation" of savings involved in an income tax, but
arises from more fundamental shortcomings of the concept of "in-
come" as a measuring rod of taxable capacity. The real inequities of
the system arise not so much from the failure to exempt savings out
of "income," but the failure to tax as "income" the spending power
that is exercised through "dissavings" (or spending out of capital) or
through capital profits or other receipts of various kinds. Since these
non-taxable sources of spending power are not distributed at ran-
dom, but are closely linked with the ownership of capital, taxation
according to "income" introduces a bias in favour of property own-
ers whose taxable capacity is underrated relatively to those who de-
rive their income from work. 232
Kaldor was influenced by the times in which he lived and worked,
which was post-WWII Britain. Those were wrenching times for Britain,
which struggled with a transition from a heavily class-bound society, with
a land-and-capital-rich gentry, to a society with a strong middle class. The
landed gentry, who typically did not work (and thus earn a labor return)
and whose periodic capital income was decimated with the war, could
nevertheless maintain their consumption spending either with debt (se-
cured by their property) or by selling assets and realizing capital gains.
Britain did not tax capital gains income (or any other kind of non-peri-
odic income that was not a return to labor, such as prizes or lottery win-
nings, other gambling winnings, gifts and inheritances, the sale of mineral
rights, premiums received on a lease, etc.) at this time. 233 Kaldor wrote:
"The net result of these exemptions is to introduce a systemic bias in
taxation in favour of property owners. '234 In other words, they could
maintain their consumption spending without paying any tax. This led
Kaldor to argue in the 1950s that to satisfy the ability-to-pay norm in this
milieu Britain needed a spending tax, not an income tax.
But he is a product of his time. "To ignore the ability to pay of those
possessing large fortunes, because their fortunes did not fit the flow of
229. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
230. See id. at 58.
231. See KALDOR, supra note 198, at 31-32.
232. Id. at 13-14.
233. See id. at 35.
234. Id. at 36.
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income model on which earlier theorists had reied, was to misconceive
the general character of the British economy at the time. '2 35 Are the cir-
cumstances similar in America today? Unlike Britain in the 1950s, we do
tax realized capital gains and non-periodic receipts (except gifts). Only
excluded borrowed amounts (and excluded gifts) can support consump-
tion spending without tax in the U.S. Are there a lot of wealthy people
who have decreased their realized income to paltry amounts-either in-
tentionally (as McCaffery implies) or unintentionally (as happened in
post-war Britain)-and who are living off of borrowed money? McCaf-
fery assumes so, but we need the empirical evidence. What we do have
does not seem to indicate that our society today is comparable in this
respect to Kaldor's Britain. As noted earlier, the top 1% in America to-
day typically works for a living, realizing significant labor returns.2 36
Moreover, they do not seem to avoid realizing built-in gains to any signif-
icant extent, 237 and (unlike Britain in the 1950s) we tax such gains, albeit
at rates below that imposed on ordinary income. And my anecdotal ob-
servation is that unrented land is not a huge component of the top 1%'s
portfolio. Even Kaldor admitted that "[i]t would be possible to improve
the income tax system considerably from the equity point of view if the
definition of 'income' were made comprehensive through inclusion of
capital gains and other casual receipts ....238
Moreover, apparently Kaldor engaged in the empirical work necessary
to establish that the super wealthy would not see a tax reduction under an
expenditure tax, as compared to the leaky income tax then in effect in
Britain. Indeed, he was convinced that the top rates imposed on "in-
come" would have to be significantly reduced if the tax base were
switched to "spending" in order to avoid a massive shift in the tax burden
to the wealthy. Kaldor wrote:
In fact, if the present nominal rates of taxation were rendered effec-
tive through a change-over to Expenditure as the basis of the levy, so
far from making the rates more progressive it would be essential (as
argued later) to reduce the scale of progression of the rates quite
considerably if a revolutionary change in the position of different
social classes were to be avoided. A change-over to an expenditure
tax would undoubtedly have the most severe effect on the wealthy
and not on the people who are only moderately well-off. It would be
therefore rather nonsensical to suggest that an Expenditure tax
would imply a less progressive method of parcelling out the burden
of taxation than the present system.2 39
This is not surprising, considering that capital gains and other non-recur-
ring realized property income were not taxed in Britain at the time. But
that is not the case in America today. McCaffery concedes as much by
235. Utz, supra note 27, at 919.
236. Krueger, supra note 110.
237. See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
238. KALDOR, supra note 198, at 14.
239. Id. at 50.
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proposing-very unlike Kaldor-that the top tax rate on spending would
have to be significantly increased to at least 50% (or more if the corpo-
rate tax were also repealed, as he also suggests) if we were to avoid a
large shift in the tax burden, but he does not particularly address whether
the top 1% would nevertheless see a decrease in its burden, as I suspect it
would. We simply need to see much more empirical evidence than he
gives us on the ratio of consumption spending to realized income in the
top 1% in America today.
His second "fairness" ground for a consumption tax is that saving is,
essentially, inherently moral behavior and ought to be rewarded and en-
couraged, period. He refers to the "virtues of saving12 40 and says that the
"The Fair Not Flat Tax aims to bring common-sense morality into the tax
system. '2 4 1 But saving is a social good only because of the consequences it
can have. Saving for rainy days, for retirement, etc., can be argued to be a
social good because it reduces the chances that the person will become a
public charge. Indeed, that is why we encourage saving by the middle
class under current law by providing it better-than-consumption tax treat-
ment for the vast majority of its savings.
But what about the top 1%? Why is it inherently moral to encourage or
reward a deca-millionaire 242 for further saving and accumulating even
more wealth? It is highly unlikely that the deca-millionaire will become a
public charge. The argument for why it is good to provide incentives to
the deca-millionaire to continue to accumulate even more wealth must be
grounded in the economic growth rationales discussed above. But McCaf-
fery, remember, disclaimed any reliance on such economic arguments. So,
beyond basic life-cycle saving, the argument becomes circular. He essen-
tially says that further saving by the top 1% ought to be rewarded, re-
gardless of whether or not it increases economic growth or the nation's
capital stock, because saving is inherently moral behavior, but the reason
it is moral vis-A-vis others in society is because it provides economic
growth and low interest rates, which helps the rest of the non-rich. It is
circular. And it conflates, even equates, the moral dimension with the
economic dimension for the top 1%. But they are separate issues, as
Slemrod and Bakija remind us.
[E]conomists have often proclaimed at congressional hearings and in
the press that one tax system is superior to another. To make such a
judgment, the economist is implicitly introducing his or her own val-
ues into the choice, values that Congress or the majority of Ameri-
cans may not share. For this reason, in principle any panel of
economists offering their opinions on the best tax system should be
followed by a panel of philosophers or ethicists who offer their views
on the ethics .... In practice, of course, we do not convene such a
panel every time an adjustment in the pattern of tax liabilities is con-
240. MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 37.
241. Id. at 77.
242. Recall that the average net worth (assets less liabilities) of the top I % is about $10
million. See WOLFF, supra note 64, at tbl.3 and note to tbl.5.
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sidered, and we rely on the political system to make these kinds of
choices. 243
D. ENDING CLASS CONFLICT
Finally, McCaffery says over and over again that his tax system will
encourage "class teamwork" and end "class conflict: '244 "I will show how
a consistent, progressive consumption tax, by encouraging the rich to
save, not spend, can move America to a promising model of class team-
work, not class conflict. '245 Indeed, his concluding chapter is entitled:
"Toward Class Teamwork, Not Class Conflict. '246 In it he says:
We can fix our tax system and put all Americans-rich and poor-on
the same side. We can have a social and economic model built on
class collaboration, not class confrontation .... Tax today is part of
the tension between economic classes, but it could help to bridge the
divide. Getting our tax system right can improve our economy, our
politics, and ultimately and most importantly, ourselves.247
But I don't see any explanation of how his tax system can lead to "class
teamwork" and not "class conflict." I can't see how enacting a tax system
that may very well allow the top 1% to accumulate an even larger share
of private wealth, and to pass it down from generation to generation, all
without tax, will lead to "class teamwork" and reduce "class conflict." He
does not address that issue in his final chapter. Rather, it contains three
subparts.
First, he again argues that a consumption tax will improve our econ-
omy, notwithstanding his earlier disclaimer that he is not making any eco-
nomic arguments in favor of his plan. 248 Second, he argues that a
consumption tax will improve our politics. Apparently, he thinks that spe-
cial lobbying interests who lobby for tax breaks under a hybrid income/
consumption tax would disappear if Congress enacts a "pure" consump-
tion tax. I have to agree with Sheldon Cohen, former IRS commissioner,
that the chances of this are slim.
It amazes me that grown men and women believe that Congress will
enact a pure [consumption tax] (that is one with no exceptions) and
keep it that way forever .... This defies belief! They expect that the
Congress that brings us new deductions and credits every year will
suddenly reform and never amend the code to help an industry or
group.... I believe that humans do not change behavior very much,
as leopards do not lose their spots. 249
243. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 69, at 53.
244. See, e.g., supra notes 140, 216 and accompanying text.
245. MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 38.
246. Id. at 112.
247. Id. at 112-13.
248. MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 42.
249. Sheldon S. Cohen, Don't Hold Your Breath Waiting for a Flat Tax, 86 TAX NOTES
1637 (2000).
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Finally, he says that a pure consumption tax will help us to "improve
ourselves." In this regard, he says "[t]he whole system is set up against
work and ordinary middle-class forms of savings . . ."250 without telling
the reader that the vast majority of middle-class savings already are pro-
tected from taxation (and, indeed, get better-than-consumption tax treat-
ment). And again he implies that the rich pay no tax while the middle
class does. "The rich, clever, and well-advised win. The not-rich lose."'251
He concludes that "the Fair Not Flat Tax will ask the nation's most fortu-
nate people to join the team, not set themselves up against it.' '252
This last part seems to be premised, once again, on the twin notions
that the rich are not paying tax because they are avoiding any realized
income and living off of borrowed money and that they are big spenders
instead of big savers. As addressed earlier, he documents neither of these
assertions, and indeed the evidence I reviewed, though meager, seems to
cast serious doubt on them.
In closing, I can't help but also comment on McCaffery's charge that
those who disagree with him are simply being stubborn and also are sim-
ply relying on stereotypes. For example, he dismisses opposition to repeal
of the estate and gift tax as nothing more than hardheadedness. "It's time
to stop the bickering, because this is an issue on which all can agree-if
only they would listen. ' 253 Those who oppose complete repeal, instead of
reform, of the estate tax are just not listening! They can't possibly have
considered objections; their objections must be frivolous. If only they
would listen ....
He also says: "Many liberals have a tendency to demonize the wealthy,
and a further tendency to lump together all members of any demonized
group. '254 I was startled when I read this because of McCaffery's own
simplistic stereotyping of rich people, which had become irritating to me
by that point. He invariably demonizes those who spend as "selfish," and
he canonizes those who accumulate great wealth as leading "noble" lifes-
tyles.255 He views anyone with wealth as having achieved it solely
"through their decisions to work hard and save well" 256 rather than
through the machinations of the marketplace. He shows no apparent ap-
preciation that some who spend are no doubt quite noble and that some
who accumulate wealth are no doubt nasty people. In fact, I have no
doubt that the top 1% contains all stripe of humanity-good, bad, and
banal. To decide whether or not to tax them on their accumulated wealth
by determining whether they are being "selfish" spenders or "noble" sav-
ers is, itself, to act on stereotype. To treat them all the same, in recogni-
tion of the fact that whether they are nefarious or virtuous, their wealth
250. MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 114.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 116.
253. Id. at 63.
254. Id. at 77.
255. See, e.g., supra notes 172, 192, 227, 228 and accompanying text.
256. MCCAFFERY, supra note 114, at 153.
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accumulation was made possible by the regulated capitalist system in
which they live, and thus they ought to contribute toward the costs of
maintaining it (whether or not they happen to spend money), seems to
me to be the route less reliant on stereotypes and demonization.
I can understand McCaffery's motivation in maintaining that his plan
will lead to "class teamwork" and not "class conflict." I assume that he is
trying to shortcut any criticism of the kind that I make throughout this
article-that the disproportionately important top 1% (important both by
measure of private wealth accumulation and by measure of the one third
tax share that they currently pay under the hybrid income/consumption
tax) would likely see their tax share drop-perhaps quite significantly.
Anyone pointing that out, as I am, can be charged with fomenting class
conflict, unlike McCaffery.
To that, I can only say that I am reminded of a Ted Rall cartoon.
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On a more serious note, I do believe that those who wish to signifi-
cantly shift the tax burden downward from the top 1% use charges of
"class warfare" against those who speak out against such plans as a mech-
anism simply to cut off debate. As mentioned earlier, those who earn the
median income of $50,000 saw their share of the aggregate federal tax
burden (including payroll taxes) increase between 1976 and 1999, while
257. See N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2002.
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the wealthy saw a decrease. 258 Why isn't that shift an illustration of class
warfare against the middle class? Why is it class warfare only when it is
suggested that those who own nearly 40% of the private wealth in this
country ought to pay at least the 20% of the aggregate federal tax burden
that they pay now, but it is not class warfare when the tax burden is sys-
tematically shifted downward, as happened in recent decades?
As the material at the beginning of this article indicates, the move away
from consumption taxation was, indeed, a move to ensure that the rich
shouldered more of the tax burden than they did under consumption
taxes. In that sense, the debate over whether we ought to return to con-
sumption taxation for all-even the top 1%-unavoidably involves a dis-
cussion of class. We should not shy away from that task. As Erik Jensen
wrote: "James Carter, representing a bank nominally defending the [new
income] tax before the Supreme Court [in 1895], conceded it was 'class
legislation in th[e] sense [of distinguishing between rich and poor]. That
was its very object and purpose.' It's hard to disagree. '259
III. GRAETZ'S VAT-PLUS PROPOSAL
The bulk of Michael Graetz's book is devoted to detailing some of the
historical and current major problems with our hybrid income/consump-
tion tax. Yet, in the end, he concludes that it is important to retain it (and
attempt to improve it) for the wealthy, in order to maintain adequate
progressivity in the tax burden.
Nevertheless, he recognizes that-as described earlier-our current tax
system is essentially a consumption tax for the poor and middle class
(since virtually all of their savings go untaxed) and an income tax for the
more affluent (whose earnings exceed many of the ceilings limiting the
savings preferences targeted at the middle class). As noted then, the most
important consumption tax feature of current law available to the more
affluent is the realization requirement, though apparently the top 1%
does not unduly avoid realization on any consistent basis.260
Recognizing this, Graetz proposes that we lift the burden of having to
file an annual tax return for those earning less than $75,000 to $100,000 or
so (depending on how the numbers crunch out) by enacting a 10 to 15%
VAT-a pure consumption tax-and then increasing the zero bracket
amount under an improved hybrid income/consumption tax2 61 to about
$75,000 to $100,000.262 To avoid imposing tax on the poor who are ex-
258. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
259. Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of
"Incomes," 97 TAX NOTES 99, 103 (2002).
260. See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
261. He encourages simplifying and reforming the pension rules, eliminating the ability
to deduct interest on debt used to purchase consumption by reforming the home-equity
debt rules, integrating the corporate and individual taxes, reforming the Social Security
and Medicare systems and integrating the tax burdens, and reducing complexity for small
businesses. See, e.g., GRAErZ, supra note 26, at 244-60.
262. See id. at 264-66.
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empted under current law, a portion of the VAT could be rebated to rep-
licate the current zero bracket amount and earned-income tax credit (or
we could create an exemption from the payroll taxes on the first chunk of
wages). In this fashion, those earning less than $75,000 to $100,000 would
be freed from the burden of having to file an annual return but would not
have their tax burden materially changed, and they would continue to
enjoy no tax on their savings, as today.263 Since the median household
income is about $50,000 per year, this would remove a very large portion
of the population from the annual filing requirement and thus would be a
major simplification. Graetz estimates that a 10% VAT and exemption of
$75,000 would have eliminated 100 million of the 107 million tax returns
filed in 1993, about 93% of the total.264 It would, in his words, be re-
turning the income tax to its roots "by return[ing] the income tax to its
pre-World War II status, when it supplied progressivity to the United
States tax system by limited application only to people at the top of the
income tax scale. ''265
He also, unlike McCaffery, would support some continuation of wealth
taxation, whether it be in the form of an estate tax or a tax on inheri-
tances. He questions
whether repeal of such an important element of progressivity with-
out any replacement is appropriate now, given the widespread evi-
dence that the distribution of wealth in the United States has become
more unequal in recent years. Protecting family farms and businesses
from having to liquidate to pay estate taxes is no reason for exempt-
ing large liquid estates from tax. Wealth inequality has always been
greater than income inequality .... 266
I absolutely support his idea of relieving a significant portion of the
population (double the median household income is a good benchmark)
from the burden of having to file returns. I believe that such a move
would dilute the support of middle America for replacing the current
Code with a pure consumption tax, since consumption tax supporters
have used frustration with the complexity of current law for the average
American as a selling tool to trumpet their proposals, which would likely
shift the tax burden downward. I have grave misgivings, however, in ac-
complishing this salutary goal by enacting a new and separate tax and by
increasing the exemption of the income tax. History teaches us that one
of two things would likely happen if we have a separate tax that applies to
only 7% of the richest filers. I would expect that either the exemptions
263. As noted earlier, McCaffery also advocated, as one alternative, enacting a VAT for
the lower classes and a cash-flow consumption tax for those households of four spending at
least $80,000 per year. See supra note 117. In other words, both McCaffery and Graetz
advocate removing the lower classes from the burden of filing an annual return while pre-
serving the consumption tax treatment that they already enjoy. Where they disagree is
whether the tax that applies to the more affluent should be a spending tax (McCaffery) or
our hybrid income/consumption tax (Graetz).
264. See GRAETZ, supra note 26, at 264-65.
265. Id. at 266.
266. Id. at 267.
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would be reduced to cover the median household again, so that such
households would be pay three federal taxes (the VAT, payroll taxes, and
the hybrid income/consumption tax) or the pressure would build to elimi-
nate the special, "punitive" tax-imposed only on the "wealthy"-and to
raise the revenue instead through increasing the VAT rates.
My concern regarding the first possibility-that the exemptions would
eventually be lowered again-rises from our experience with enactment
of the payroll tax in 1935. Congress could have funded the new Social
Security system by lowering the income tax exemptions to bring the aver-
age wage earner into the income tax fold. As I describe elsewhere:
If that had been done, their wage income would have been taxed
only once at the federal level-even as the income tax itself ex-
panded to raise more revenue with WWII-and the increased reve-
nues obtained under the general income tax from this expansion
could have funded the payments made under the program. In other
words, Social Security spending would have been simply one more
government program supported by general tax revenues, but those
general tax revenues would be collected from the lower and middle
classes, who would benefit from the new program, as well as the
wealthy.
But there were important political reasons for the separate tax. If
the "tax" could be sold as an "insurance contribution" rather than a
"tax," and Social Security benefits perceived as simply the return for
which prior premiums were paid, President Roosevelt believed that
"by virtue of a statutory 'compact' between the contributors and
Congress,... a future President and Congress could not, morally or
politically, repeal or mutilate the 'entitlement' character of the
program."...
Moreover, there was simply no need at the time to expand the
income tax downward, as opposed to enacting a separate tax on
wages, in order to avoid a future "double tax" problem, since the
income tax was itself thought at the time to be a tax that would never
reach the lower and middle classes. It was, therefore, not likely fore-
seen that the labor income of these lower- and middle-class workers
would soon be taxed twice-once under the new payroll tax and
once under the income tax. As Professor Carolyn Jones has related:
In testimony before the Senate Finance Committee in 1932,
Herbert Hoover's Treasury Secretary, Ogden Mills, aptly de-
scribed the very limited scope of the individual income tax up to
that time. "We have become accustomed," he said, "to high ex-
emptions and very low rates on the smaller taxable incomes. That
is our fixed conception of an income tax and it is very difficult as a
practical matter to change fixed conceptions of this character."
She went on to note that this "fixed conception" remained promi-
nent through the middle and late 1930s in Roosevelt's New Deal,
when the payroll tax was enacted. "In public pronouncements,
Roosevelt and prominent Congressmen linked income taxpaying to
plutocracy and rejected imposition of income taxes upon 'average'
citizens." Moreover, Congress agreed.
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Congress was . . . quite clear as to who should not be paying
income taxes. When Senator LaFollette proposed reducing exemp-
tions to $2,000 for couples and $800 for singles [in 1935], he was
soundly defeated. At a time when three-fourths of American fami-
lies were at or below the $2,000 level at which they could live de-
cently, Sen. Alben Barkley argued that LaFollette's measure
would hurt the "average citizen" and "average families" "whether
we consider the average man as one who receives less than $5,000
a year or one who receives less than $10,000 a year-we can make
up our own average to suit our own view of what an average ought
to be."
• . . This attitude toward income taxation continued through the
1930s. 267
It took the cataclysm of WWII to lower the income tax exemptions to
reach the middle class. I doubt that it would take another cataclysm to do
so again. Prior to WWII, the income tax had never been paid by the mid-
dle class. As noted in the quotations unearthed by Carolyn Jones, there
was widespread antipathy to extending the income tax to the middle
class. The perception of the income tax as appropriately being limited to
the wealthy was deep-seated and entrenched. It went to the very heart of
what people thought income taxation was all about. But today we have
lived with an income tax that has covered the middle class for literally a
half century. Congress would not have the high perceptual hurdles it once
had to overcome to extend the income tax downward again. It is not a
common mindset today to think of income taxation as being appropri-
ately limited to plutocracy. Something far less significant than WWIII-
the war on terrorism?, a prescription drug benefit for Medicare?, ensur-
ing the solvency of Social Security?-could realistically be cited as requir-
ing the exemption, alas, to be reduced. At the least, it would be far too
easy to freeze any indexation for inflation, thus effectively reducing the
exemption significantly over time, as happened in the decades following
WWII.2 6 8
It's no answer to say that the Congress that enacts the VAT and raises
the income tax exemptions can make its intention very clear that future
Congresses should not reduce the exemptions. Graetz, himself, notes that
Congresses cannot bind future Congresses in such a manner when he ar-
gues that no consumption tax would remain pure for long.
Our system of government, with new elections of the House of Rep-
resentatives and one-third of the Senate every two years and of pres-
idents every four years, does not give one Congress the power to
prevent different legislation by a subsequent Congress. It is impossi-
ble, therefore, for any legislative body to make a viable binding polit-
ical commitment to fair taxation over any person's lifetime. Indeed,
as we have seen, each new Congress is tempted to change the tax
267. Geier, supra note 29, at 27-29 (footnotes omitted).
268. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
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law, and all at least threaten substantial change. 269
He's right. In another context, he writes:
Steve Forbes, Dick Armey, and the Wall Street Journal have all
claimed that Congress will not raise tax rates under a flat tax because
"everybody would have the same rate and you cannot raise it with-
out everybody knowing and complaining." This faith that enacting a
flat-rate consumption tax will hamstring the voracious appetite of the
Congress for revenues seems naive. In 1990 Democrats proposed a
"millionaires surtax"-a higher tax rate on income over $1 million.
This prompted Phil Gramm to say "millionaires today, thousandaires
tomorrow," .... The claim that moving to a flat-rate tax will guaran-
tee the people of this nation lasting freedom from high tax rates,
from narrowly targeted taxes, from special tax advantages, from un-
fair tax differentials is a pipe dream. It denies all historical
experience. 270
I think that Graetz's faith that Congress would both (1) index his
$75,000 to $100,000 exemption so that its value is not reduced over time
and (2) not reduce the exemption over time in order to raise revenue is
similarly naYve. We simply can't bind future Congresses, and past history
belies such a rosy prediction. Enacting a VAT for low- and middle-income
people coupled with an income tax with a $100,000 exemption would
likely result-over time-in a lowering of that high exemption with the
result that low- and middle-class workers would be taxed three times at
the federal level. The fact that Mitrusi and Poterba's studies, indicating
that three-fourths of households earning the median income of $50,000
paid more in payroll taxes than income taxes, were such big news illus-
trates that it's easy to lose sight of the combined federal tax burden when
focusing on proposals to change only one of the tax systems. We tend to
focus only on one tax system at a time when measuring the tax burden.
Indeed, the growth of European welfare states was fueled by adding a
consumption tax-typically VATs-to income taxes.
Or-one could even envision it going the other way. The separate in-
come tax imposed only on the "wealthy" could be seen, much like the
estate and gift tax, as a "soak-the-rich" tax aimed only at the wealthy that
punishes success and is thus fundamentally unfair. You could already
hear the calls that the wealthy should be subject to only the same tax-
the VAT-that applies to the lower and middle classes, that also taxing
them under a separate income tax unfairly double taxes them. We can't
ignore the potential for such political rhetoric in whatever tax design is
chosen, as Graetz himself recognizes that the populace is often swayed by
such rhetoric. For example, he notes that most Americans typically tend
not to support VATs and sales taxes while sometimes supporting a cash-
flow consumption or flat tax without realizing that they are all variations
269. GRAETZ, supra note 26, at 203.
270. Id. at 232-33.
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on the same theme-consumption taxes.271 This possibility is particularly
true if the estate tax is also retained, as Graetz seems to support, which
would then create "two" special taxes imposed only on the "wealthy" in
addition to the VAT imposed on everyone.
For these reasons, I think that it is important to do whatever reform we
do within the context of a single tax system. Indeed, I have also recom-
mended integrating the payroll tax burden on labor income with the in-
come tax burden on labor income. 272 In this way, the real distribution of
the federal tax burden can be made more transparent. But Graetz's ulti-
mate goal of removing a large portion of the population from the burden
of having to file tax returns should be pursued vigorously. It would not be
easy; perhaps it is impossible in America. But this is the direction in
which I would like to see intellectual energy devoted.
The vast majority of lower- and middle-class wage earners in England,
for example, need not file annual returns, since all tax due is withheld at
source. Only those with more complicated tax lives must file annual re-
turns. The PAYE system 273 not only applies to money benefits but also to
certain benefits in kind, such as stock options, and it applies on a cumula-
tive basis, taking into account the taxpayer's personal exemptions. "The
system can also be used to collect underpayments of tax from that or a
previous year, as well as to refund overpayments. ' 274 Inland Revenue
does all the work. As Slemrod and Bakija describe:
[I]n the income tax systems of the United Kingdom and Japan, the
ultimate simplification is achieved-no filing at all. They manage this
271. See id. at 212, 216-20 (noting that since Americans tend not to support replacing
the income tax with a retail sales tax or a VAT, consumption tax supporters have had to
disguise their taxes with income tax garb to mask the fact that they are consumption taxes);
id. at 189-91 (warning of the political impact of "colorful anecdotes").
272. See generally Geier, supra note 29. For this reason, it might be better to replace the
estate and gift tax on donors with an income inclusion under I.R.C. § 102 for donees in
excess of a de minimis amount. With an income inclusion, the tax is integrated with the
income/consumption tax. Moreover, carryover basis for any property received in kind
(which I think is unworkable) could be avoided; with an income inclusion, the donee,
should be entitled to a stepped-up, fair market value basis. Section 102 could be amended
to provide that all gifts and inheritances above $11,000 (indexed to inflation) per year must
be included by the recipient. (The $11,000 figure is patterned after the amount that can be
given to each donee per year without owing a gift tax or reducing one's lifetime exemption.
A basic annual exclusion at this level would clearly allow the exclusion of holiday gifts and
such to continue, as under current law.) As under current law, support payments to depen-
dents (such as college tuition payments made by a parent) would not be considered to be
"gifts" and would be excludable under the common law rule for support payments within
an intact family. (Under current law, for example, tuition payments in excess of $11,000 per
year made on behalf of a child do not trigger a gift tax. See I.R.C. § 2503(e) (2002).) If it is
desirable to recreate the $1 million exemption under the current estate tax, amended § 102
could provide that $11,000 per year is excluded and does not count toward a lifetime $1
million exclusion for inter vivos gifts and inheritances. (This might raise less revenue than
under the current gift-and-estate tax, since the $1 million lifetime exclusion would be per
donee, not per donor. A $10 million estate, for example, could be dispersed among 10
donees and trigger no tax. The lifetime exclusion amount might therefore have to be
lower.)
273. See JOHN TILEY, REVENUE LAW 212-17 (4th ed. 2000).
274. Id. at 216.
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by having a very simple tax base for most taxpayers and a sophisti-
cated system of employer withholding (called PAYE, or "pay as you
earn," in the United Kingdom) that ensures that come year-end, ex-
actly the appropriate amount of tax has been withheld by the em-
ployer-no refund and no tax due. Interest and dividend income is
taxed at the source of payment at a fixed rate. Many British taxpay-
ers wouldn't recognize a tax form if they saw one.
In fact, thirty-six countries use some form of no-return system for
at least some of their taxpayers. Almost all use some form of exact
withholding as in the U.K., but Denmark and Sweden achieve it with
a tax agency reconciliation (TAR) system. Under a TAR system, tax-
payers provide basic information to the tax authority, which then cal-
culates tax liability based on this information and what is provided to
it from employers and other institutions. Taxpayers have a chance to
review (and contest) these calculations, after which refunds or addi-
tional tax payments are made.
The U.S. Treasury tax proposals of 1984 contained an exact with-
holding scheme, called the "return-free" system, which was to be
available for more than half of all taxpayers. It was never enacted,
though, because the system wasn't simplified enough to make it fea-
sible. Note that establishing a return-free system for many taxpayers
accomplishes what might be called "populist simplification," because
it completely eliminates the hassle of tax filing for a large number of
voters. 275
The common denominator of any plan that would allow a return-free
alternative for middle class taxpayers, however, would be the surrender
of many of the special tax breaks that make each person's tax calculation
so unique (accompanied, presumably, with reduced tax rates). While
that's a tough habit to break in America,2 76 it might be doable. The aver-
age taxpayer seemed initially taken with the so-called flat tax-even
though he would have had to give up most deductions and credits-until
he learned that it was a consumption tax that dramatically shifted the tax
burden downward. The average Joe didn't seem to mind giving up the
deductions, so long as it wasn't accompanied by a shift in the distribution
of the tax burden. Enacting a return-free system for the vast majority of
taxpayers, within a single income/consumption tax that would not reduce
the percentage of the tax paid by the top 1%, would itself qualify as "fun-
damental tax reform," in my book. But this would be fundamental reform
that I could support.
275. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 69, at 250-51.
276. See, e.g., The Back to School Tax Relief Act of 2002, proposed in the summer of
2002, which would "extend the present-law above-the-line deduction for higher education
tuition and expenses to expenses incurred for elementary and secondary ... education."
Description of H.R. 5193, The "Back to School Tax Relief Act of 2002" (July 24, 2002),
2002 TAx NOTEs TODAY 143-45 (2002).
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CONCLUSION
Everyone seems to agree that the tax system is broken. Where it's
tough to find agreement is what to do about it. Under the norms of my
own personal ideology of tax justice that I describe here, I think it unfair
to return to pure consumption taxation, even if the rates on spending
were made progressive. The shift in the tax burden away from the top 1%
that would likely occur, away from those who accumulate wealth under
our capitalist system, is not defensible to me. Since that wealth accumula-
tion is made possible through taking advantage of what our regulated
capitalist system has to offer, the wealth earned under it ought to be
tapped to support the costs of that system, whether or not it happens to
be spent.
Michael Graetz's work points to a different reform: Don't change the
tax base dramatically but merely simplify it for the lower and middle clas-
ses, and make it return-free for them to boot. Since the truly poor don't
owe tax, and the middle class essentially already enjoys consumption tax
treatment, it ought to be possible to create a return-free tax for the mid-
dle class on consumption without reducing the tax burden on the top 1%.
But, in my view, it is important that this be accomplished within a single
tax system. Because of the risks that I describe here, we should avoid
enacting two tax systems, such as an individual VAT coupled with an in-
come tax with large exemptions. I simply don't believe that the resolution
regarding the distribution of the tax burden would stand the test of time
as well as it would under a single tax system.
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